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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms’ tax
compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Tax-
payers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than 6 million euros
in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below the eligibility threshold in
order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. The response is stronger in sectors where
transactions leave more paper trail, suggesting that monitoring effort and the trace-
ability of information reported by firms are complements. We estimate that there
would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller
businesses.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, many tax administrations have established special units to monitor
and improve the tax compliance of the largest taxpayers, following the advice of multi-
lateral organizations (IMF, 2002; OECD, 2011). The expected benefits from establishing
large taxpayers units (LTUs) include the ability to raise higher tax revenues and, more
generally, increasing the efficiency of tax administration. Despite the widespread adop-
tion of this size-dependent tax enforcement strategy around the world, there is very little
micro-level evidence the effects of LTUs on firm behavior. Moreover, we are not aware
of any existing empirical research that evaluates the welfare effects of size-dependent tax
enforcement.
In this paper, we study the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms’ tax
compliance and the welfare implications of this policy. In particular, we analyze how
firms respond to the increased monitoring effort created by the eligibility cutoff of the
Spanish Large Taxpayers Unit. This LTU focuses exclusively on firms with total operating
revenue above e6 million, a threshold established in 1995 that has remained constant in
nominal terms ever since. The LTU has more auditors per taxpayer than the rest of the
tax authority, and these auditors are on average more experienced and better trained to
deal with the most complex taxpayers. Thus, while firms above and below the eligibility
threshold face the same tax schedule and essentially the same compliance procedures,
monitoring effort changes discretely at this arbitrary cutoff. This allows us to study to
what extent stricter monitoring interacts with the availability third-party information
to increase firms’ tax compliance. We first derive a simple theoretical model to analyze
how firms are expected to respond to the increase in monitoring, and we then test these
predictions exploiting the quasi-experimental variation generated by the LTU threshold.
In the baseline theoretical framework, firms make production and tax reporting deci-
sions given a tax rate on reported profits. Underreporting revenue lowers tax liabilities,
but it also implies some resource costs (e.g., keeping two sets of accounting books or fore-
going business opportunities). The detection probability increases endogenously with the
amount evaded by firms, depending on the interaction between (i) the resources devoted
by the tax authority to analyze tax returns and other paper trail generated by business
activities (“monitoring effort”); and (ii) the legal reporting requirements and the available
technology to process the information generated by business transactions (“enforcement
technology”). In line with the quasi-experimental variation created by the LTU, we as-
sume that monitoring effort jumps up discretely at a given level of reported revenue,
while the enforcement technology remains constant. This creates an incentive to bunch
below the LTU threshold to avoid stricter tax enforcement. We introduce heterogeneity
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across firms in the resource costs of evasion and in the effectiveness of monitoring effort,
which depends on the traceability of firms’ transactions. Given that intermediate input
sales are easier to trace because they leave more paper trail, the model predicts a stronger
bunching response by upstream firms compared to downstream firms, which sell mostly
to final consumers. This implies that monitoring effort and the traceability of information
trails are complementary.
In the empirical analysis, we use data from financial statements that Spanish firms
must submit by law to the Commercial Registry (Registro Mercantil). The Banco de
España compiles and digitalizes this information since 1995, creating a confidential ad-
ministrative dataset. This dataset contains firm-level information on annual net operating
revenue, input expenditures, number of employees, payroll taxes, total value added, and
the tax base and liability in the corporate income tax, making it possible to analyze mul-
tiple margins of firms’ responses to the tax enforcement threshold. The dataset covers
more than 80% of registered businesses in Spain with operating revenue between 3 and 9
million euros (the relevant range in our analysis) for the period 1995-2007, during which
the LTU threshold remained constant at e6 million.
We document three main empirical findings. First, we find that a significant number of
firms report revenues just below the LTU revenue threshold to avoid stricter monitoring.
Our bunching estimates indicate that firms reduce their reported revenue by e121,000 on
average (about 2% of their total revenue). We estimate the marginal buncher’s response
to be bounded between e382,000 and e520,000, equivalent to 6.4%-8.7% of total reported
revenue. Robustness checks show that the bunching response is not due to other size-
dependent policies, and the estimates are robust to different parametric assumptions to
estimate the counterfactual distribution.
Second, we study the relationship between monitoring effort and information trails.
We define 16 sectors of activity and use the percentage of revenue obtained from sales
to final consumers as a proxy for the traceability of transactions made by firms in each
sector. We find that the average bunching response is significantly higher in upstream
sectors (e.g., heavy manufacturing and wholesale) than in downstream sectors (e.g., retail,
restaurants and hotels), suggesting that the effectiveness of additional monitoring effort is
higher the easier it is to trace firms’ transactions. This finding suggests that information
trails and monitoring effort are complements, because it is the interaction of these two
elements that deters firms from evading taxes. We show that this complementarity cannot
be attributed to a systematic correlation between firm size characteristics, such as number
of employees or fixed assets, and the size of the bunching response.
Third, we examine the mechanisms used by firms to avoid stricter tax enforcement.
In the presence of multiple taxes (corporate income tax, CIT, value-added tax, VAT, and
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payroll tax, PRT), firms may evade taxes not only by underreporting revenue but also
by overreporting material inputs and underreporting labor costs. To study the nature
of the bunching response, we derive predictions on the average relative use of inputs
at the threshold depending on whether the bunching response is due to lower output
(real response) or underreported revenue (evasion response). Our results show that the
average ratio of material expenditures over total revenue shifts down sharply at the LTU
threshold. In contrast, the average ratio of the wage bill (net of payroll taxes) as a share
of total revenue shifts upward. If bunchers reduced their true output, both ratios would
jump up at the threshold, because they are more productive than other firms below the
threshold. Hence, while the cross-sectional patterns do not identify causal effects, they
are incompatible with a real response. We also rule out the hypothesis that firm size or
sectoral composition effects drive these results.
The evidence on reported tax bases suggests that stricter monitoring creates a tax
compliance effect on large firms that is equivalent to broadening statutory tax bases. We
document a stable one percentage-point gap (5% vs. 6%) in the average reported taxable
profit (the tax base of the CIT) and significant jumps in the VAT and payroll tax bases
between the two tax-enforcement regimes. These gaps are persistent well beyond the
interval around the LTU threshold, suggesting that they cannot be explained only by
selection due to the bunching response. Even in the presence of third-party reporting
and detailed information requirements, medium-sized and small firms take advantage of
their role as fiscal intermediaries appropriate part of the VAT that they should remit to
the tax authority, and evade CIT and payroll tax. Overall, the significant tax-reporting
regime shift associated to the LTU suggests that this policy is an effective tool to reduce
tax evasion.
We extend our theoretical framework to study the net welfare change associated to
raising tax monitoring on firms by expanding the tax authority’s resources. We show
that this policy can be a more efficient way to raise revenue than increasing marginal tax
rates if the gains from reducing the resource costs of evasion exceed the administrative
cost of the enforcement policy. This framework allows us to examine the mechanisms and
conditions under which size-dependent tax enforcement policy, implemented through a
LTU, can be welfare improving. Our novel findings indicate that this policy has positive
effects on tax compliance, because medium-sized firms evade a substantial amount of
taxes even in the presence of extensive information reporting. Applying the theoretical
framework to the Spanish case, we provide calculations of the marginal resource costs
of evasion indicating the substantial welfare gains of reducing tax evasion of large firms.
These calculations also suggest that there would be substantial net welfare gains from
extending the scope of the LTU to monitor smaller firms.
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This is the first paper to provide credible estimates of the effects of size-dependent tax
enforcement policies on firm behavior. Our results are consistent with the insights from
the literature on size-dependent policies and firm behavior. One strand of this literature
has focused on evasion and avoidance responses at thresholds that determine eligibility
to certain taxes, both theoretically (Keen and Mintz, 2004; Dharmapala, Slemrod and
Wilson, 2011; Kanbur and Keen, 2014; Bigio and Zilberman, 2011) and empirically (Onji,
2009; Liu and Lockwood, 2015). Other studies have instead analyzed the impact of size-
dependent regulations on aggregate productivity, given the pervasive incentives for firms
to remain inefficiently small (Guner, Ventura and Xu, 2008; Restuccia and Rogerson,
2008; Garicano, Large and van Reenen, 2016). Our results indicate that firms under low
tax monitoring may look smaller in the data than they are in reality because of rev-
enue underreporting, which could have implications for the estimates of the relationship
between productivity and firm size.
This study is more broadly related to the literature on tax evasion by firms. Several
recent studies have emphasized the importance of third-party information reporting as
an effective deterrent against tax evasion (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Gordon and Li,
2009; Pomeranz, 2015; Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2016). Indeed, experimental evidence
shows that the individual tax compliance rate is almost perfect when there is third-party
reporting, but it is substantially lower for self-reported income (Slemrod, Blumenthal
and Christian, 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; IRS, 2012). Nonetheless, it is worth noting
that monitoring firms is more complex than monitoring individuals, due to the large
amount and variety of transactions that need to be verified jointly to determine the correct
tax liabilities in several tax bases.1 Our finding that monitoring effort and information
trails are complementary demonstrates the positive impact of information flows through
the production chain on tax compliance, in line with the results obtained by De Paula
and Scheinkman (2010) and Pomeranz (2015) in developing economies. However, our
results also highlight the difficulty of effectively reducing corporate tax evasion, even in
the presence of extensive third-party information reports, without devoting additional
monitoring resources to exploit the information flows generated by firms’ paper trail.2
The empirical techniques used in this paper draw on the rapidly-growing bunching
literature, which analyzes agents’ responses to thresholds in taxes and regulations.3 Our
1 As taxpayers, firms remit corporate income tax and a share of payroll tax. As tax collectors, they
withhold income and payroll tax from employees. In most countries, firms also remit value added tax
(VAT) payments (Bird and Gendron, 2007; Keen and Lockwood, 2010).
2 Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016) and Slemrod et al. (2015) also document limitations of
third-party reporting in two very different contexts, Ecuador and the United States. Both studies find
a similar result: firms respond to improved third-party reporting of revenue by evading through less
verifiable margins, such as input expenditures, leaving their reporting tax base unchanged.
3 In the seminal paper of this literature, Saez (2010) exploits kinks—income thresholds at which the
marginal tax rate jumps—to identify taxable income elasticities. Kleven (2016) surveys the rapidly-
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estimation strategy is closest to the one proposed by Kleven and Waseem (2013), who
exploit notches4—i.e., income thresholds at which the average tax rate jumps—to identify
structural elasticities in the presence of optimization frictions. The novel feature of our
setting is that the Spanish LTU generates a notch in enforcement intensity, rather than
the tax rate, allowing us to study the effects of tax enforcement policies in isolation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and derives the bunching estimators.
Section 4 describes the institutional context and the data. Section 5 presents the estima-
tion results. Section 6 discusses welfare and policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We extend the Lucas (1978) model to examine the problem of profit-maximizing firms that
can evade taxes and face the risk of being detected and fined. In the baseline setting, firms
make production decisions and can underreport their revenue (i.e., evade taxes), which
implies incurring a resource cost. The probability of detection depends on the interaction
between (i) the monitoring effort devoted by the tax authority to examine tax returns
and other paper trails generated by firms’ transactions and (ii) the existing enforcement
technology used in this process, including the degree of detail of information-reporting
requirements. We use this framework to analyze how firms respond to a discontinuous
increase in monitoring effort at an arbitrary revenue threshold. We then extend the model
to incorporate heterogeneity across firms in the effectiveness of monitoring effort and in
the resource costs of evasion. The model with heterogeneity yields testable predictions
on the expected effects of stricter tax enforcement on firms’ decisions.
2.1 Corporate Taxation with Risky and Costly Evasion
Consider an economy with a continuum of firms of measure one. Firms produce good
y combining tax-deductible inputs x and nondeductible inputs z according to the pro-
duction function y = ψf(x, z), where ψ is a productivity parameter and f(·, ·) is strictly
continuous, increasing and concave in both arguments. Productivity ψ is exogenously
distributed over the range [ψ, ψ] with a smoothly decreasing and convex density d0(ψ) in
the population of firms. Firms purchase deductible and nondeductible inputs in compet-
itive markets at unit cost w and q, respectively, and sell their output at the market price
p, which is normalized to unity.
The government levies a proportional tax t on taxable profits P = y − wx, so net-of-
tax profits with truthful reporting are given by Π = (1−t)P−qz. Since the tax authority
growing literature using bunching estimation techniques.
4 Slemrod (2010) provides a general description of notches in tax and regulatory systems, and two
recent papers, Best and Kleven (2016) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) use bunching estimation tech-
niques to study notches generated by property transaction taxes.
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does not perfectly observe all transactions in the economy, firms may attempt to evade
taxes by misreporting taxable profits. In the baseline case, firms can underreport their
revenue by an amount u ≡ y−y ≥ 0, where y is reported revenue5 and, therefore, reported
taxable profits are given by P = (1 − t)[y − wx]. The direct and indirect resource costs
of evasion are captured with the reduced form κ(u), which is an increasing and convex
function of concealed revenue.6 We initially assume this cost function to be the same for
all firms, but we relax this assumption later.
The tax authority detects evasion with probability δ = φh(u), where φ > 0 is the
monitoring effort parameter, and h(·) is a continuous, increasing and convex function
of underreported revenue. The endogenous component, h(u), represents the enforcement
technology used to match tax returns among trading partners and to review the paper trail
created by information-reporting requirements. Convexity ensures that a larger amount
of unreported activity increases the probability of detection more than proportionally,
because each reporting inconsistency leaves a new paper trail. The monitoring effort
parameter, φ, represents the amount of resources devoted by the tax authority to the
audit process. It is an exogenous policy choice that encompasses both quantity (e.g., the
total number of auditors employed by the tax authority) and quality (e.g., the auditors’
skill level and the actual effort exerted during audits).
We model the probability of detection as the interaction between monitoring effort and
the available technology to capture the intuition that the two elements are complementary
to determine the deterrence effect of tax enforcement policy. Finally, we assume that,
when evasion is detected, the tax authority imposes a fine with a penalty rate θ over the
amount of tax evaded, on top of the true tax liability.7
Firms make production (i.e., demand of inputs x and z) and reporting (i.e., under-
reported revenue u) decisions in order to maximize expected after-tax profit, given by
EΠ = (1 − t)[ψf(x, z) − wx] − qz − κ(u) + tu[1 − φh(u)(1 + θ)]. An interior optimum
satisfies the following system of first-order conditions:8
5 In subsection 5.3, we discuss the predictions of an extended model in which firms can also evade
taxes by misreporting their input costs. We fully derive the extended model in the online appendix.
6One example of these resource costs of evasion is the need to maintain two parallel accounting books
to keep track of “black” payments made in cash. Tax evading firms may also forego business opportunities
by not accepting credit cards or bank payments, given that it is much easier to conceal cash transactions.
See Chetty (2009b) for a detailed discussion on the economic nature of these resource costs.
7 For simplicity, we assume that when discrepancies between firms’ reported transactions are detected,
the authorities uncover the full amount evaded.
8 The assumption of a convex detection probability is sufficient to ensure the second-order condition
for an interior optimum is satisfied.
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ψfx(x, z) = w (1)
ψfz(x, z) = q/(1− t) (2)
t[1− φh(u)(1 + θ)] = κu(u) + tu(1 + θ)φhu(u) (3)
where the term [1− φh(u)(1 + θ)] is the expected rate of return of evasion. This system
of equations indicates that a positive tax rate has two effects. First, it distorts the choice
of inputs, reducing production below the zero-tax optimum. Second, it creates incentives
to evade taxes, thereby reducing reported revenue for all firms in equilibrium. Simple
comparative statics show that an increase in monitoring effort φ leads to a decrease in
concealed revenue u without affecting production decisions.
To provide more intuition on firms’ incentives to evade taxes, we define the elasticity
of detection probability with respect to concealed income as εδ,u ≡ φhu · u/δ, and rewrite
the optimal evasion condition (3) as follows9
1 =
κu(u)
t
+ (1 + θ)δ(u) [1 + εδ,u] . (4)
The right-hand side of (4) identifies the two mechanisms that contribute to raising tax
compliance by firms. The first term shows the disincentive effect created by the presence
of marginal resource costs (relative to the marginal benefit of evasion, i.e., the tax rate).
The second term represents the deterrence effect generated by the interaction between
the tax authority’s monitoring effort and the enforcement technology to review the paper
trail generated by misreporting behavior.
Given that the production and resource cost functions, f(·) and κ(·), are the same for
all firms, all the variation in reported revenue y is due to differences in productivity ψ.
Assuming that monitoring effort φ is constant across all firms, there exists a density func-
tion of reported revenue g0(y) which is smoothly decreasing and convex in its full domain
[ymin(ψ), ymax(ψ)].10 The theoretical revenue distribution G0(y) is smoothly decreasing
and convex in firms’ productivity, as depicted by the dashed curve in Figure 1a.
Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU): A Tax Enforcement Notch. Assume now that
the government provides additional resources to the tax authority in order to create a
Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU). This reform raises the monitoring effort without affecting
the enforcement technology. Formally, the LTU increases monitoring effort from φ0 to
φ1 ≡ φ0 + dφ (where dφ > 0) only for firms with reported revenue y > yL, where yL
denotes the threshold for LTU eligibility. The probability of detection is then given by δ =
9 This equation is similar to the one derived by Kleven et al. (2011), but obtained from the choice
problem of firms, with an additional term to capture the impact of resource costs of evasion.
10 The specific mapping between the productivity and reported revenue density functions depends on
the functional forms of the production function f(·) and the enforcement technology h(u).
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[
φ0 + dφ · 1
(
y > yL
)] ·h(u), where 1(·) is the indicator function. The introduction of the
LTU creates a tax enforcement notch, meaning that monitoring effort and, consequently,
the probability of detection increases discretely at the arbitrary revenue level yL.
The predicted behavioral response to the tax enforcement notch allows us to classify
firms in three groups depending on their exogenous productivity draw: low productivity,
bunchers, and high productivity firms. First, “low productivity” firms are those whose
incentives do not change with the introduction of the LTU and whose productivity draw
is in the range [ψ, ψL]. The upper bound of the set of low productivity firms is defined by
the firm with a productivity ψL such that its reported revenue is exactly the enforcement
threshold yL in both tax enforcement regimes. The detection probability does not change
for those firms and thus their production and reporting decisions are not affected by the
introduction of the LTU.
Second, “bunchers” are firms with productivity draws in the range
(
ψL, ψM
]
, which
have incentives to avoid being under the LTU scrutiny. The firm with productivity ψM ,
such that its pre-LTU reported revenue is yM > yL, establishes the upper bound of the
bunchers group and is called the marginal buncher. Upon introduction of the LTU, this
firm is indifferent between reducing its reported revenue to bunch at yL (which reduces its
expected tax bill but implies resource costs of evasion), or remaining above the threshold
facing stricter tax enforcement. Formally, its expected net-of-tax profits are the same in
both cases: EΠ0
(
x, z, u|φ0, ψM
)
= EΠ1
(
x, z, u|φ1, ψM
)
, where subscripts 0 and 1 refer to
production and evasion decisions under low and high enforcement intensity, respectively.
The set of firms with ψ ∈ (ψL, ψM) consists of those whose expected tax savings associ-
ated to bunching are strictly positive, i.e. EΠ0
(
x, z, u|φ0, ψM
)−EΠ1 (x, z, u|φ1, ψM) > 0.
Hence, the bunchers have incentives to report yL, generating a mass point point at yL in
the distribution of reported revenue, and a hole with zero mass in the range
(
yL, yM
)
.
Third, “high productivity” firms are those with productivity draws in the range ψ ∈
(ψM , ψ]. After the reform, these firms are monitored by the LTU because the costs of
bunching (resource costs of evasion plus the increased probability of detection) outweigh
the benefits (the expected tax savings under lower enforcement intensity). Under stricter
tax enforcement, those firms report higher revenue than they did before the reform. This
creates a rightward shift in the distribution of reported revenue above yL, marginally
extending the hole in the post-LTU distribution. The reported revenue distributions pre-
and post-LTU are depicted by the solid blue curve in Figure 1a.
To obtain a quantifiable measure of the behavioral response to the tax enforcement
notch, we use a first-order approximation to relate the number of bunching firms to the
change in the marginal buncher’s reported revenue, following the method first proposed
by Saez (2010). For analytical simplicity, consider the case in which the LTU raises
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monitoring effort by a small amount dφ = φ1 − φ0 > 0, such that the marginal bunching
firm adjusts its reported revenue by dyM . The adjustment is proportional to dψ =
ψM−ψL, the difference in productivities between the marginal buncher and the firm that
locates at the notch before the LTU is introduced. Since there is a direct mapping between
the productivity distribution d0(ψ) and the pre-LTU reported revenue distribution g0 (y),
we can define the number of bunching firms at the threshold as
B =
ˆ yL+dyM
yL
g0 (y) dy
≈ 1
2
[
g0
(
yL
)
+ g0
(
yL + dyM
)]
dyM
(5)
where g0(yL) denotes the height of the pre-LTU density distribution at the threshold
and we use a trapezoid approximation to account for the fact that the density function
g0(y) is downward-sloping in the bunching range. The number of bunching firms depends
positively on the increase in monitoring effort at the notch and negatively on the resource
costs of evasion. Using the approximation in (5), we define the bunching estimator b as
the ratio of excess bunching over the average height of the counterfactual density at the
LTU threshold, that is,
b ≡ B
1
2
[
g0(yL) + g0
(
yL + dyM
)] ≈ dyM . (6)
This is equivalent to the standard estimator used in the existing bunching literature,
(e.g., Chetty et al., 2011). Geometrically, the estimator approximates the length (in
euros) of the interval of reported revenue where bunching firms would have located in the
counterfactual scenario without the LTU.
2.2 Heterogeneous Firms
We extend the baseline model to introduce firm heterogeneity along two dimensions: the
effectiveness of tax enforcement policy across firms, and the importance of resource costs
of evasion. Considering this heterogeneity, the LTU creates different incentives to bunch
for firms with the same productivity level, and the model predicts differential increases
in reported revenue for high productivity firms (i.e., those monitored by the LTU). As
a result, the extended model no longer predicts a hole with zero mass in an interval
above the LTU threshold, but only a triangle of missing mass in that interval. In the
presence of heterogeneous agents, the bunching method applied to notches allows us to
derive estimators of both the average revenue response to the LTU policy attenuated
by resource costs of evasion, and the structural response that we would observe in the
absence of such costs.
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Heterogeneous Effectiveness of Monitoring Effort. We assume now that the
effectiveness of tax enforcement policy depends on the traceability of misreported business
transactions, which is related to the amount of paper trail. We define paper trail as
any document that the tax authority can review in order to detect tax evasion. This
includes tax returns, financial statements, credit-card transactions, banking transactions,
sales receipts, etc. Among this broad set of documents, the reports on business-to-
business transactions play a prominent role in tax enforcement because they can be very
easily cross-checked (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Pomeranz, 2015). For that reason,
we assume that an increase in the resources devoted to monitoring activities is more
effective at uncovering evasion from firms that sell mainly to other businesses, because
their transactions generate substantial paper trail, compared to firms that sell directly to
final consumers, where sales generate little or no paper trail.11
Under the assumption of heterogeneous effectiveness of tax enforcement, the LTU is
more effective at monitoring upstream firms than downstream firms (whose transactions
are harder to trace), at each productivity level. As a consequence, upstream firms have
stronger incentives to bunch at the LTU threshold, and they also report higher revenue
when they belong to the “high productivity” group.
To capture this intuition formally, assume a joint distribution of productivities and
monitoring effort with density g˜(ψ, φ) on the domain (ψ, ψ) x (φ0, φ). The behavioral
response for low and high productivity firms at each monitoring effort level is character-
ized by the set of conditions (1)-(3). Instead, bunchers make an infra-marginal decision
taking into account the heterogeneous discrete change of monitoring effort dφ that they
face and their distance from the notch. At each monitoring effort φ, firms in the pre-LTU
density interval (yL, yL + dyMφ ) have incentives to bunch if they expect tax savings from
that action. Note that the revenue response of the marginal buncher, dyMφ , is increasing
in the effective monitoring effort that it faces. We assume that the distribution of mon-
itoring effort effectiveness is such that there is zero mass in the interval
(
yL, yD
)
, where
yD = dyMφmin is the pre-LTU revenue level of the marginal buncher facing the smallest
effectiveness change. No firm has an incentive to locate in this region, because they could
simultaneously reduce reported revenue and increase expected profits.12 The rest of the
bunching interval is given by
(
yD, yub
)
, where yub = dyMφmax is the pre-LTU revenue level
11 The distinction is particularly stark in tax systems with a value-added tax (VAT) applied using the
credit-invoice method, as in the Spanish case. In this context, every business-to-business transaction has
to be reported on VAT returns by two different firms, while final consumer sales are only reported by
the seller. The amount of paper trail generated by final sales is particularly scarce, or even nonexistent,
in the case of cash transactions.
12 The prediction of a hole in the distribution of firms in a short range just above the LTU threshold
only holds when we rule out the possibility that firms face prohibitive resource costs of evasion (e.g., due
to honesty or risk aversion), because the costs of misreporting outweigh the benefits in terms of expected
tax savings. We relax this assumption in the next subsection.
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of the marginal buncher associated to the largest monitoring effort change. Bunching
provides expected tax savings only if the change in monitoring effort at the LTU thresh-
old is large enough to overcome differential resource costs dκ(u), so only a share of firms
in the interval
(
yD, yub
)
have incentives to bunch. Since downstream firms experience a
smaller increase in effective monitoring effort, they have lower incentives to bunch (for a
given productivity level and resource cost function).
With this setup, we can quantify the average reported revenue response from the
observed bunching at the LTU threshold. Let g˜0(y, φ) be the joint distribution of reported
revenue and monitoring effort when tax enforcement is smooth with constant φ, and
denote by g0(y) ≡
´
φ
g˜0(y, φ)dφ the unconditional reported revenue distribution absent
the tax enforcement notch. We can write the excess bunching mass at the threshold as
B =
ˆ
φ
ˆ yL+dyMφ
yL
g˜0(y, φ)dydφ
≈ 1
2
[
g0
(
yL
)
+ g0
(
yL + dyM
)] · E[dyMφ ], (7)
where E[dyMφ ] is the average response in reported revenue. This term is a weighted average
of the marginal buncher’s response at each tax enforcement change implied by the LTU.
We denote by bav the estimator of the average bunching response in the population, which
is the ratio of excess bunching over the counterfactual reported revenue density at the
threshold,
bav ≡ B1
2
[
g0 (yL) + g0
(
yL + dyM
)] ≈ E[dyMφ ]. (8)
This estimator measures the average revenue response to the LTU policy attenuated by
the costs of evasion. That is, the estimator averages the response of the bunchers and
the lack of response of those that do not bunch (non-bunchers).
Heterogeneous Resource Costs of Evasion. We now let resource costs of evasion
κ(u) differ across firms with the same productivity. For instance, the costs of evading a
certain amount of taxes might vary depending on the number of employees with whom
the employers would need to collude in order to evade (Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2016).
These costs can also depend on managers’ preferences (e.g. risk-aversion and honesty),
or on their attention and effort devoted to misreport transactions rather than allocating
their skills to productive activities. Besides, evading firms bear the opportunity costs of
foregoing business opportunities with trading partners that do not engage in misreporting
(Chetty, 2009a). Through any of these channels, firms might face different resource cost
functions and, therefore, firms with the same productivity have heterogeneous costs of
misreporting. In the LTU context, this implies that firms with the same incentives to
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react face differential costs of adjustment. For some firms with incentives to bunch given
their productivity draw ψ and the change in monitoring effort effectiveness dφ, resource
costs of evasion can be so large (“prohibitive”) that they exceed the benefits of bunching.
Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we leverage the strong incentives generated by
the notch to quantify the structural reported revenue response, i.e. the response that
would be observed if evasion were costless. Let α(y, φ) denote the proportion of firms
that, given the change in monitoring effort that they face, have incentives to bunch but
face prohibitively high resource costs of evasion (given their level of reported revenue and
monitoring effort effectiveness). For analytical simplicity, we assume that this proportion
is constant in the bunching interval associated to the LTU, such that α(y, φ) = α for
y ∈ (yL, yL + dyMφ ). The presence of prohibitive resource costs is thus the factor that
creates mass in the short-range
(
yL, yD
)
above the threshold. The excess bunching mass
at the LTU threshold is now given by
Badj =
ˆ
φ
ˆ yL+dyMφ
yL
[1− α(y, φ)] · g˜0(y, φ)dydφ
≈ 1
2
[
g0
(
yL
)
+ g0
(
yL + dyM
)] · (1− α) · E[dyMφ ], (9)
where E[dyMφ ] is the average reported revenue response at the LTU threshold.
Given (9), the bunching parameter that measures the structural response (i.e., the
response that we would observe in the absence of resource costs of evasion) can be written
as
badj ≡ bav
1− α ≈ E[dy
M
φ ]. (10)
Expression (10) indicates that the larger the number of bunching firms and the smaller
the hole in the bunching region (i.e. the higher the share of non-bunchers) the larger is
the structural response to stricter tax enforcement. We discuss in subsection 3.1 how we
estimate the lower and upper bounds of this structural response.
3 Empirical Strategy: Bunching Estimators
This section presents the empirical procedure to estimate the reported revenue response
of firms to a tax enforcement notch created by the existence of a LTU. To quantify this
response, we adapt the techniques from the bunching literature in individual taxation
(Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013) to estimate the parameters
derived in the previous section.
The basic procedure to estimate the reaction of firms to a LTU relies on constructing
a counterfactual distribution of reported revenue in the absence of a tax enforcement
notch, and comparing it with the observed distribution. To build the counterfactual, we
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fit a high-degree polynomial to the observed density, excluding an interval around the
threshold. We discuss below how the excluded interval is determined. Dividing the data
in small bins of width w, we estimate the polynomial regression
Fj =
q∑
i=0
βi · (yj)i +
yub∑
k=ylb
γk · 1 (yj = k) + ηj, (11)
where Fj is the number of firms in bin j, q is the order of the polynomial, yj is the
revenue midpoint of bin j, ylb and yub are the lower and upper bound of the excluded
interval (respectively), and the γk’s are intercept shifters for each of the bins in the
excluded interval. Then, using the estimated coefficients from regression (11), we estimate
the counterfactual distribution of reported revenue, that is, F̂j =
∑q
i=0 β̂i · (yj)i. This
expression excludes the γk shifters to ensure that the counterfactual density is smooth
around the threshold.
Comparing this counterfactual density to the observed distribution we can estimate
the excess bunching mass to the left of the threshold (B), and similarly the missing mass
to the right of the threshold (H), given by
B̂ =
yL∑
j=ylb
(
Fj − F̂j
)
≥ 0 and Ĥ =
yub∑
j=yL
(
F̂j − Fj
)
≥ 0.
We follow the estimation method proposed by Kleven andWaseem (2013) to determine
the lower and upper bounds of the excluded region. This procedure imposes that the areas
under the counterfactual and observed densities have to be equal, and thus the missing
area (H) has to equal the excess mass (B). Implicitly, this is equivalent to assuming that
all responses to the tax enforcement notch are on the intensive margin.
The assumption of no extensive-margin responses might be violated. For example,
some firms may strategically split up into two or more legally distinct entities to avoid
being in the LTU. The resulting firms would not necessarily bunch just under the thresh-
old.13 In this case, the additional mass to the left of the threshold would push the
counterfactual distribution upwards, creating a downward bias in the bunching estimates.
However, as some (though not necessarily all) of these firms are coming from the bunching
interval
(
yL, yub
)
, the missing mass would exceed the true bunching mass, introducing an
13 The LTU’s revenue criterion refers to individual legal entities or consolidated fiscal groups (article
121 of the VAT Law), not to corporate groups. Consolidated fiscal groups are quite narrowly defined,
requiring that the parent firm owns at least 75% of the subsidiary’s capital (art. 67 of Royal Decree
4/2004) and that all firms share the same activity code. Therefore, a firm with annual revenue below
e6.01 million would be included in the LTU census if it belongs to a consolidated fiscal group, but not if
it is only part of a corporate group. According to the Statistics published by the Spanish Tax Authority
from 2004 to 2007, less than 1% of firms in the revenue range e1.5-e6 million are part of the LTU due
to belonging to fiscal groups (we do not have firm-level information). Hence, we do not expect this issue
to generate a relevant bias in our bunching estimates.
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upward bias. There is no reason to believe that these two biases will cancel out exactly,
but the size of the net bias relative to the estimates is likely to be small.
Another potential concern is that the method to obtain the counterfactual does not
account for the increase in reported revenue by high productivity firms. This intensive-
margin response shifts the observed distribution to the right. However, this rightward
shift is of second-order importance for the estimation of the counterfactual, because the
observed distribution is approximately flat to the right of the bunching segment.14 Again,
it is unlikely that this would create a large bias in the bunching estimator in the current
setting.
To obtain the bunching estimates, we first fix the lower bound ylb at the bin where
the decreasing trend of the reported revenue density reverts to an increasing rate due
to the bunching response. Second, we set the upper bound at yub ≈ yL and then run
regression (11) multiple times, increasing the value of yub by a small amount after each
iteration. When bunching is substantial, the first few iterations yield large estimates of
B̂ and small estimates of Ĥ. This estimation procedure iterates until reaching a value of
yub such that missing and bunching areas converge, i.e B̂ = Ĥ.15
Once we have an estimate for the excess number of bunching firms B and the counter-
factual density at the threshold g0(y), we can estimate the average bunching parameter
bav defined in equation (8). The explicit formula for the estimator is given by
b̂av =
B̂
1
2
(
F̂yL + F̂yub
) (12)
where F̂yL and F̂yub are the height of the counterfactual density at the notch and at the
upper bound of the bunching interval, respectively. This estimator measures the average
reported revenue response of firms in the bunching interval.16 The magnitude of the
response depends on the effectiveness of the policy across firms, attenuated by the costs
of their reaction. We estimate the standard errors using bootstrapping.17
14 This point is also noted by Kleven (2016).
15 In the empirical application there is a finite number of bins, so we impose the condition that the ratio
be “close” to one, i.e. Hˆ/Bˆ ∈ [0.9, 1.1]. The sensitivity analysis presented section 5 and the appendix
shows that all our bunching estimates (bav and badj) are robust to the choice of the excluded region.
16 In earlier bunching papers (e.g., Chetty et al., 2011), the b estimator is defined as the ratio of excess
bunching mass over the height of the counterfactual density at the threshold, and then the elasticity
is calculated separately. In the results presented below, we multiply the estimator of bav times the bin
width w in order to obtain a money metric directly.
17 We thank Michael Best for sharing his Stata code to perform the bootstrapping routine. In all the
results shown below, we perform 200 iterations to obtain the standard errors. Using a larger number
does not affect any of the results.
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3.1 Adjusted Bunching Estimator
In subsection 2.2, we derived the parameter badj to quantify the structural response that
would be observed in the absence of resource costs of evasion. To estimate this structural
response empirically, we need to estimate the proportion of firms (α) that, having incen-
tives to bunch given the dφ that they face at the notch, do not react because the costs
of misreporting are higher than the expected tax savings of bunching. According to the
model with heterogeneous firms, the only factor preventing a bunching response in the
short range (yL, yD) is the existence of prohibitively high resource costs of evasion.18
For simplicity, we assume that the proportion of non-bunchers, α, is constant in the
bunching range.19 We can then construct the estimator α̂ ≡
´ yD
yL
g(y)dy
´ yD
yL
g0(y)dy
. In our empirical
application, the upper bound of this interval, yD, is not uniquely defined because it
depends on the change in the effectiveness of monitoring effort, dφ, which is heterogeneous
across firms. Hence, to obtain the empirical estimates of α we select several plausible
values of yD and show that the resulting estimates of blbadj across sectors and years are
robust to this choice.20
Using the estimate of α, we reweigh the average bunching estimator in (12) to obtain
the adjusted bunching estimator
b̂lbadj =
b̂av
1− α̂ , (13)
which provides a lower bound measure of the structural reported revenue response to
stricter tax enforcement. This is a lower bound because the proportion of non-bunchers
increases with the distance from the notch, rather than being constant as we assume.
The upper bound of the structural response is determined by the convergence point
between the counterfactual and the empirical densities, yub. In the model with heteroge-
neous monitoring effectiveness, the convergence point identifies the behavioral response
of the firm on which the LTU is most effective. Therefore, we interpret the estimator
b̂ubadj = yub − yL as an upper bound of the structural response. This is what Kleven and
Waseem (2013) call the “convergence method”.
18 In the rest of the bunching interval, (yD, yub), both resource costs and a small change in monitoring
effort dφ may prevent bunching behavior, but it is not possible to empirically disentangle the relative
importance of the two factors.
19This is a conservative assumption, because the importance of resources costs of evasion most likely
increases with the distance from the threshold, and so does the proportion of non-bunchers.
20These robustness checks are reported in Tables A.7 and A.8 in the online appendix.
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4 Institutional Context and Data
4.1 Tax Administration Thresholds: the Spanish LTU
The Spanish tax authority established a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in 1995 to increase
monitoring effort on the largest taxpayers, defined as firms with annual operating revenue
above e6 million.21 This eligibility threshold has not been modified since then, and the
number of firms in the LTU census (excluding public companies) more than tripled from
11,107 in 1995 to 34,923 in 2007, mainly due to strong economic growth (yearly average
of 4%) and inflation (yearly average of 3%) in the period 1995-2007.22 Over that period,
the overall staff of the tax authority–and the LTU in particular–stagnated, while the
enforcement technology and IT systems, including the introduction of electronic reporting
and modern data management, improved steadily (AEAT, 1995-2007). Thus, the effective
enforcement resources per taxpayer available to the LTU could have declined over time,
although it is hard hard to quantify the importance of the technological improvements.
Firms in the LTU represent only 2% of those that submit a corporate income tax return,
but they report about 80% of all taxable profits, 65% of total sales subject to VAT, and
they employ 40% of private sector wage earners (AEAT, 1995-2007).
Businesses just above and below the LTU threshold face the same tax schedule on
all the major taxes (corporate income, value added and payroll taxes), and the same
administrative requirements related to invoicing, accounting and information reporting.
The monitoring process on taxpayers works in several stages: first, the tax authority’s
electronic system processes all detailed the information reported in tax returns to detect
inconsistencies or mistakes. Second, the system automatically cross-checks tax returns
with other available information such as financial statements or transactions reported by
third parties (e.g., trading partners or banks) to detect any discrepancies. Up to this point
in the process, the enforcement technology is the same for firms above and below the LTU
threshold. Once the system detects an inconsistency on a specific tax return, tax auditors
analyze the paper trail available for that firm and request additional clarifications or tax
payments using notification letters. If a large inconsistency is detected, the staff may
21 The threshold was originally set at 1 billion pesetas (e6.010121 million at the official exchange rate).
There are two exceptions to the eligibility rule: (i) exporters are always included in the LTU census, and
(ii) firms based in two small regions with independent tax authorities (Navarra and País Vasco) are only
included if they obtain a large proportion of revenue from sales in the rest of Spain. We provide more
details on the LTU eligibility rule, including the role of corporate groups, in online appendix C. In 2006,
an additional threshold at e100 million in operating revenue was established to determine eligibility to
the Central Office for Large Taxpayers, a select group of the largest firms within the LTU which have
access to more individualized legal consultation. We do not observe a bunching response around this
threshold.
22The impact of economic growth can be seen in the evolution of the total number of firms in the
economy, which increased more than twofold in the period of analysis, as shown in Table A.4 in the
online appendix.
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start a full tax audit.23
The key difference we exploit in our empirical strategy is the fact that the LTU has
more auditors per taxpayer than the rest of the tax authority, and those auditors have on
average higher qualifications and experience. This implies that the LTU makes heavier
use of the available information and enforcement technology to detect tax evasion than
the rest of the tax authority. This policy setting provides quasi-experimental variation
in the monitoring effort (captured by φ in the model) faced by large firms, while keeping
the information requirements and enforcement technology (captured by h(u)) equal for
firms around the LTU threshold. Therefore, it allows us to examine firms’ responses to a
more effective tax enforcement system.
4.2 Data
In the empirical analysis, we use data from financial statements that all Spanish firms
must submit by law to the Commercial Registry (Registro Mercantil). Firms are also
required to reproduce these public official documents on their annual corporate income
tax return, so there are no incentives to report different information on the two docu-
ments. In fact, auditors from the tax authority routinely cross-check tax returns against
published financial statements to detect discrepancies (for example, to ensure that the
annual operating revenue figure is the same in both).
The Banco de España has compiled and digitalized all the financial statements sub-
mitted for the period 1995-2007 to construct a confidential administrative dataset. This
micro-dataset has a panel structure and includes the following information for each firm:
business name, fiscal identifier, sector of activity (4-digit CNAE-2009 code), Balance
Sheet, Profit & Loss Account, and number of employees.24
Comparing the number of firms in the Banco de España dataset to official statistics of
corporate income tax filers for the period 1995-2007, we observe that our dataset contains
almost 80% of all firms with reported revenue between e3 and e9 million, the relevant
range in the empirical analysis (see Table A.4 in the online appendix for details). The
main reason for missing observations is that some firms submit their statements late or
on paper form, in which case they may not have been digitalized. The analysis performed
by the Banco de España statistical division concludes that missing firms are on average
less transparent, which may be positively correlated with misreporting behavior. Among
23LTU auditors focus exclusively on LTU firms, even though they have access to information on all
firms. If they find a discrepancy in the reporting of a non-LTU firm, they can flag it in the system,
but they cannot start an audit process against that firm. Therefore, the possibility of tax enforcement
spillovers across the LTU threshold is limited.
24 In an earlier version of this paper (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2014) we used a similar dataset
from Amadeus, also constructed using financial statements from the Commercial Registry, obtaining
almost identical results. We provide further details about the current dataset used, including summary
statistics, in online appendix D.
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reporting firms, the Banco de España dataset identifies some firms as having “unreliable
data”, often because of rounding issues or inconsistent reporting. We drop these firms
(about 7% of the total) and obtain a final dataset of 285,570 firm-year observations with
reported revenue between e3 and e9 million from 86,009 unique firms in the period
1995-2007. We expect any bias due to excluding missing and unreliable firms from our
sample to go against finding a behavioral response to avoid being in the LTU.25
5 Results
We first document and quantify the reported revenue response of Spanish firms to the
notch in effective tax enforcement created by the existence of a LTU. Second, we examine
the heterogeneity of this response across sectors of activity to test the hypothesis that
monitoring effort and the enforcement technology are complements. To do this, we use the
relative position of firms in the value chain as a proxy for the effectiveness of monitoring
effort in each sector. Finally, we analyze the expected effect of the LTU on tax compliance
by analyzing reported tax bases, identifying manipulation in reported input expenditures
as an additional channel of tax evasion.
5.1 Bunching Estimates: Reported Revenue Response
Figure 2 shows the distribution of reported revenue for Spanish firms in the period 1995-
2007, using administrative micro-data from financial statements collected by Banco de
España. The graph shows the counterfactual density (dashed line) and the observed
density (solid line), overlaid. We focus on firms in the range between e3 and e9 million,
such that the LTU threshold is in the center of the graph. There is substantial bunching
just below the LTU threshold, indicating that a significant number of firms attempt to
avoid stricter tax enforcement by keeping their reported revenue below e6 million.26
In order to quantify the excess bunching mass, we estimate the counterfactual distri-
bution by fitting a flexible polynomial, as explained in section 3. For the average bunching
estimator, we obtain b̂av = 0.121 (s.e. 0.007) which is statistically different from zero at
the 1% level. This point estimate implies that firms originally in the bunching interval
reduce their reported revenue by about e121,000 on average (approximately 2% of their
total reported revenue) in response to the tax enforcement notch. The interpretation of
25The Spanish Tax Authority (AEAT) has cooperated with the Banco de España to verify that the
dataset used in this study is representative of, and bunching results consistent with, the confidential
census-level tax return data held by the AEAT. The nature of the statistical exercises done by the
AEAT have been reported to this Journal, but the strict disclosure policies that apply to the Spanish
Tax Authority do not allow the publication of those results outside of its official publications.
26 There is another modest spike in the distribution at about e4.75 million, associated to a requirement
to perform an external audit of the accounts. Since this bunching response is very localized, it does not
affect our main estimates. We provide additional discussion in online appendix C, and for the rest of the
paper we focus on the response to the LTU threshold.
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bav as an average response derives from the assumption that firms are heterogeneous. The
estimate of bav is a weighted average of the bunchers’ response and the lack of reaction
of non-bunchers.
Two features of the distribution of reported revenue deserve additional discussion.
First, bunching below the LTU threshold is somewhat diffuse, rather than the single spike
predicted by theory. This could be due to the indivisibility of some large transactions,
which need to be either reported in full or not reported at all. Another explanation could
be the artificial division of firms into multiple entities to avoid crossing the threshold. As
discussed in section 3, the sign of the bias created by this extensive-margin response is
theoretically ambiguous. In the sensitivity tests reported below, bunching estimates are
robust to a wide range of parametric choices, so this potential bias is a minor concern.
Second, we do not observe a “hole” with zero mass to the right of the LTU threshold.
Instead, there is a substantial number of firms reporting revenue just above yL. The model
with heterogeneous firms predicts the existence of mass in the bunching interval for two
reasons: heterogeneity in the change in monitoring effectiveness (dφ), and variation in
the resource costs function κ(u) across firms. Taken together, these two features lead to
the existence of a triangle of missing mass to the right of the LTU threshold, which can
be seen empirically comparing the observed and counterfactual distributions of reported
revenue in Figure 2.
The empirical procedure presented in subsection 3.1 allows us to estimate bounds
for the structural response to the policy. Using the adjusted bunching estimator, we
obtain b̂lbadj = 0.382 (s.e. 0.036). Under the assumption that resource costs of evasion
are heterogeneous across firms and increasing with the distance to the threshold, this
represents a lower bound of the structural response. The upper bound is given by the point
of convergence between the observed and counterfactual densities. Convergence occurs
at e6.53 million, so the upper bound estimate is b̂ubadj = 0.52. These point estimates
imply that the structural reported revenue response to avoid being monitored by the
LTU is bounded between e382,000 and e520,000 (that is, 6.4% to 8.7% of total reported
revenue for firms around the LTU notch). The gap between the upper and lower bounds
of the structural response suggests that there is more uncertainty in the estimation of
this parameter than in the case of the average bunching estimator (bav).
Robustness. We examine the robustness of the bunching estimates reported above
in several ways. First, the observed response could be affected by other size-dependent
policies, such as a corporate income tax benefit that offers a 5 percentage-point lower tax
rate to small firms.27 We do not find any evidence of bunching in response to this tax
27 The eligibility threshold for this tax benefit changed over time, from e1.5 million in 1995 to e8
million in 2007, as shown in Table A.2 in the online appendix. The distribution of reported revenue
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break, even when we only include firms with positive taxable profits in the estimation.
The lack of reaction to such a large reduction in the corporate income tax rate is re-
markable in a context where firms respond strongly to a discontinuity in tax enforcement
intensity. This evidence indicates that a relevant share of Spanish firms perceives that
being under the LTU has a potentially large cost.28
Second, pooling several annual cross-sections together increases the effective sample
size allowing us to obtain very precise estimates, but it could mask differences in the
response across years. Table 1 shows that bunching estimates are statistically significant
in every year for the period 1995-2007.29 There is some variation in bunching across years,
partly due to the smaller sample size in the annual subsamples. Bunching is somewhat
stronger in the earlier years, which could be due to the fact that the LTU threshold
remained fixed in nominal terms throughout the entire period and hence the effective
change in monitoring effort dφ may have declined over time, as suggested in section 4.30
In order to obtain more precise estimates, for the remainder of the paper we focus on the
pooled 1995-2007 dataset.
Third, in the results reported above, we set the lower bound of the excluded re-
gion equal to ylb = 5.7 and the order of the polynomial to construct the counterfactual
equal to 5. We estimate the proportion (α) of non-bunching firms using the interval(
yL, yD
)
= (6.01, 6.15) as the baseline case. An exhaustive sensitivity analysis shows
that the results are robust to a wide range of values for the lower bound (ylb), the order
of the polynomial (q), the bin width (w) and the upper bound of the non-bunchers’ in-
terval (yD).31 In the empirical exercises in the next subsection, we focus on the average
bunching estimator (̂bav) because the attenuated response is the most relevant for policy
and welfare discussions, given that resource costs of evasion are not expected to decline
over time.
under each of the thresholds is shown in Figure A.1.
28 Devereux, Liu and Loretz (2014) study firms’ responses to corporate tax kinks in the UK and find
significant bunching. In their setting, kinks are set in terms of taxable profits, whereas in the Spanish
case the tax incentive depends on operating revenue, which is considered less easily manipulable (Best
et al., 2015; Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal, 2016). This makes the strong bunching in reported revenue
that we observe at the LTU threshold even more remarkable.
29The annual histograms are shown in Figure A.2 in the online appendix. In an earlier working pa-
per version (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2014), we reject the possibility that these patterns emerge
because of repeated bunching, i.e. a small proportion of firms stay in the bunching interval for many
consecutive years. The conclusion from the analysis is that the static bunching estimates are not sys-
tematically biased due to persistent bunching behavior, because there is only evidence of short-term
persistence for a proportion of bunching firms (i.e. some firms remain at most 2-3 years in the bunching
interval).
30The number of bunching firms significantly increased over time because of the strong nominal growth
of the economy (see section 4), but the relative impact of the LTU on the firm size distribution, i.e. the
bunching estimates, declines smoothly over time as shown in Table 1.
31 The results of these robustness checks are reported in online appendix Tables A.6, A.7 and A.8.
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5.2 Heterogeneous Responses: Complementarity Result
In the model with heterogeneous firms, we assume that the effectiveness of monitoring
effort (φ) depends on the traceability of a firm’s transactions. According to the theo-
retical predictions, we expect a larger response to the LTU threshold for upstream firms
(which sell mostly to other firms) than for downstream firms (which sell mostly to final
consumers). In practice, it is relatively easy to cross-check tax returns to detect misre-
ported intermediate input sales because the buying firm has an incentive to record its
expenses to claim tax credits. In the case of final sales, the consumer has no incentive
to keep a receipt and therefore it is significantly harder to cross-check those transactions
against other information sources, especially when they are made in cash.32
To study heterogeneous responses to the LTU threshold empirically, we define 16 sec-
tors of activity.33 Since we do not have transaction-level data for each firm, we use the
percentage of sales made to final consumers in each sector (from input-output tables34)
as a proxy for the traceability of sales made by firms in that sector. Figure 3 plots the
percentage of final consumer sales (in the horizontal axis) against the average bunch-
ing estimates by sector (vertical axis). The relationship is downward-sloping, suggesting
that the incentive to remain under the LTU threshold is stronger in sectors where a low
percentage of sales is made to final consumers. On the top-left corner we observe sec-
tors such as specialized construction activities, transportation, and metal and equipment
manufacturing. Firms in these sectors sell less than 10% of their output to final con-
sumers, and they all present high average bunching estimates, between 0.12 and 0.20. On
the bottom-right corner, we find retailers and restaurants and hotels. These businesses
obtain more than 80% of their revenue from sales to final consumers and they feature a
much lower bunching response, between 0.07 and 0.09.35
The negative correlation between a high share of final consumer sales and the size of
the bunching response at the enforcement notch is consistent with the predictions of our
theoretical framework. The empirical result suggests that the deterrence effect associated
to higher monitoring resources is most effective for firms whose misreported transactions
are easier to detect. In contrast, the increase in monitoring resources is less binding for
firms that sell mostly to final consumers. This does not inform us about the level of tax
32 Naritomi (2015) studies an innovative policy implemented in the state of Sao Paulo (Brazil), where
consumers were incentivized to keep receipts from all their purchases (by entering a lottery and receiving
a partial income tax rebate). Consistently with our framework, she finds that the program had a much
stronger effect on the sales reported by retail sector firms compared to wholesalers.
33 Details about how we define each of the sectors can be found in online appendix D.
34 We use the input-output tables for the Spanish economy in year 2000 published by the Institute of
National Statistics (INE).
35 The counterfactual and empirical distributions of revenue in all sectors are shown in the online
appendix Figure A.3, and all the point estimates are reported in Table 2.
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evasion in different sectors, as it could well be that the actual amount evaded is higher
for restaurants and hotels than for metal manufacturers. The key insight is that, in
sectors with a high share of final sales, even a highly-skilled team of LTU auditors may
be unable to detect evasion using standard methods such as information cross-checks. In
conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests that monitoring effort and the existence of a
paper trail are complements. The deterrence component that contributes to higher tax
compliance derives from the interaction of these two elements, rather than from each of
them independently. Finally, note that complementarity is a local result: if the level of
evasion is very low (or zero), additional monitoring effort will be ineffective.
Robustness. One potential concern is that other firm size characteristics, such as the
number of employees or the level of fixed assets, might prevent firms from engaging in
tax evasion. Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2016) make this point theoretically, arguing that
larger and more complex firms are less likely to reach a colluding agreement to evade taxes,
as there is a higher chance that one of the employees may act as a “whistleblower”. Another
potential concern is that the resource cost of evasion κ(u) might vary systematically across
sectors in a way that could be correlated both with bunching and the share of final sales.36
Table 3a reports a set of OLS regressions of average bunching estimates by sector
on the share of final sales. In the simple regression (unconditional) case, the coefficient
is -0.072 (s.e. 0.028), which implies that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of
final sales is associated with an average reported revenue response to the LTU threshold
e7,200 lower in that sector. Controlling for the median number of employees and the
median tangible fixed assets (a proxy for complexity), has no effect on the size nor the
statistical significance of the coefficient of interest. When we also control for the share of
non-bunchers (α), the coefficient declines slightly in absolute value to -0.054 (s.e. 0.023),
but it remains statistically and economically significant. Table 3b reports the results of
weighted least squares (WLS) on the same specifications, using the inverse of the variance
of the bunching estimates as weights. The coefficient on the share of final sales decreases in
absolute value to −0.049, but it remains strongly significant and robust to using different
sets of controls. In additional robustness checks reported in the online appendix, we
show that the raw correlation between median employees (or median fixed assets) with
average bunching is close to zero and statistically insignificant (Figure A.4 in the online
appendix). Moreover, Figure A.5 and Table A.9 show that the complementarity result
holds separately for the subsamples of firms below and above the median of the two firm
size characteristics. Finally, the result is robust to different choices of the bin width in
the bunching estimation (Figure A.6).
These tests suggest that the complementarity result is not due to a systematic relation
36We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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between firm size characteristics and bunching. The share of final sales is a robust de-
terminant of the size of the bunching response in each sector, supporting the theoretical
prediction that monitoring effort and the enforcement technology are complements.
5.3 LTU Effectiveness and the Effect on Tax Compliance
In this subsection, we examine the nature of the behavioral response around the LTU
threshold and the impact of the policy on the behavior of firms monitored by the LTU.
This is a first step towards analyzing the welfare implications of the policy, but it is
challenging from an empirical point of view because bunching is an endogenous response,
so we cannot apply a standard regression discontinuity design.
To examine the effect of the LTU on tax compliance, we extend our theoretical frame-
work to allow firms to evade taxes by misreporting their input expenditures (besides
misreporting their revenue) in the presence of multiple taxes, namely corporate income
tax (CIT), value-added tax (VAT) and payroll tax (PRT). Enabling firms to misreport
their inputs yields testable predictions on whether the bunching response is on average
due to a change in real production or simply to tax evasion. We summarize the predic-
tions of this extended model below (the full derivation is in the online appendix) and test
them empirically using information on reported input expenditures and tax bases. We
use these tests to rule out mechanisms that are inconsistent with theory, rather than to
identify causal effects.
Theoretical Predictions with Multiple Taxes. The extended model with multi-
ple taxes shows that firms have incentives to underreport revenue and overreport material
expenditures in order to evade both VAT and CIT. Similarly, there is an incentive to un-
derreport labor expenditures to evade PRT and avoid regulatory costs of labor.37 Since
the probability of detection is higher under the LTU, firms above the threshold have a
smaller incentive to evade taxes and they report larger amounts in each of the three tax
bases. To study the mechanisms associated to the bunching response, we consider as
outcome variables the average reported ratios of tax-deductible input expenditures (ma-
terials and labor) as a fraction of operating revenue. We evaluate the predictions of the
model under three scenarios:38
(a) Real production response: bunching firms that reduce production have a higher
37 Underreporting labor expenditures increases corporate tax liabilities, but this can be compensated
by the tax savings on the payroll tax. During the period under study, the statutory payroll tax in Spain
was 38% (including both the employer’s and the employee’s shares), compared to a corporate income tax
rate that declined from 35% to 30%. Moreover, keeping reported salaries low and paying part under the
table protects firms against future negative shocks, because there is downward nominal wage rigidity.
There is theoretical support for wage underreporting via collusion agreements between employers and
employees in Yaniv (1988), and pervasive empirical evidence of this practice in developing countries
(Kumler, Verhoogen and Frias, 2015; Best, 2013) and even in the US (Slemrod and Gillitzer, 2014).
38 See online appendix B for the mathematical derivation of these predictions.
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productivity draw (ψ) than those originally located below the threshold, so they need
fewer inputs to produce the same amount of output. As a result, average material and
labor expenditures as a fraction of revenue follow a downward slope in the interval (ylb, yL)
due to the increasing share of bunchers, and both ratios shift upward at the threshold.
(b) Evasion via revenue underreporting : bunchers demand the same inputs (and pro-
duce the same output) as they would without an LTU, but they do not report a fraction
of their revenue. This response mechanically increases both reported input ratios, yield-
ing an upward trend in both ratios in the interval (ylb, yL) and a downward shift at the
threshold.
(c) Evasion via revenue and input misreporting : firms with a larger scope to misreport
inputs to minimize their tax liability (i.e., overreporting materials and underreporting
labor costs) have stronger incentives to bunch to avoid being monitored by the LTU,
because they obtain larger tax savings in expectation. Combined with revenue underre-
porting, this leads to an upward trend in the materials ratio in the interval (ylb, yL), and
a downward shift at the threshold. The prediction is exactly the opposite for the ratio of
labor expenses over reported revenue.
Empirical Evidence: Reported Input Expenditures. Figure 4a plots the av-
erage reported ratio of material expenditures to reported revenue (vertical axis) against
reported revenue (horizontal axis) for the period 1995-2007.39 The ratio follows an up-
ward slope in the reported revenue range between e3 and e6 million with a concave
shape, indicating that firms with higher revenue use an increasingly larger proportion of
material inputs. The relative use of material inputs shifts sharply downwards at the LTU
threshold by about two percentage points (from 79% to 77%). Figure 4b shows a similar
plot for the reported ratio of the total wage bill (net of payroll taxes) over revenue. The
pattern in this case is reversed: the ratio slopes down smoothly with an upward jump of
about one percentage point (from 10.5% to 11.5%) at the threshold.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with the scenario of evasion response with both
revenue and input misreporting. Under this hypothesis, bunching firms conceal part of
their revenue to avoid the stricter tax enforcement of the LTU, which gives them more
leeway to misreport their input expenditures. One potential alternative explanation for
the observed patterns could be that labor-intensive (or capital-intensive) firms are less
likely to bunch due to prohibitive resource costs of evasion. Indeed, if such costs were
systematically correlated with the number of employees or the level of fixed assets, the
39 To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1%
of the outcome variable. That is, we set extreme values in each e1-million interval equal to the 1st and
99th percentile. In addition, we use wider bins than in the histograms shown before (e120,202 instead of
e60,101) to reduce the amount of noise in the bin averages, although the results are robust to different
bin widths as shown in Figure A.13 in the online appendix. We do not adjust for inflation because the
outcome variables are ratios of two nominal amounts.
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bunching response would create discontinuities in the input ratios due to composition
effects. We discard this hypothesis by showing that the bunching response is very similar
in each of the four quartiles of the employment distribution (or the tangible fixed assets
distribution), as shown in Figures A.7 and A.8 in the online appendix. Moreover, Figures
A.9-A.12 show that the breaks in average reported material and labor expenditures at the
LTU threshold are not driven by a particular subset of labor or capital-intensive firms.
Instead, we observe clearly differentiated patterns in these variables on each side the LTU
threshold for all quartiles of both variables.40
Empirical Evidence: Reported Tax Bases. We study the implications for tax
compliance by comparing reported tax bases by firms monitored by the LTU and those
below the eligibility threshold. To do this, we exploit the richness of our dataset, which
includes the reported tax bases and tax liabilities of the CIT and PRT, and a proxy for
the tax base of the VAT.
Figure 5a shows average taxable profits (the tax base of the CIT) as a percentage of
reported revenue (left) and in million euros (right).41 In the left panel, we observe an
upward shift in the average reported taxable profit margin from 5% below the threshold
to 6% above. The average taxable profit margin is remarkably stable on both sides of the
threshold, even far away from the interval affected by selection due to bunching (around
e5.5-e6.5 million). This suggests that there is a “reporting regime shift” at the point
where firms become eligible for the LTU, which cannot be driven only by selection. This
1pp gap in taxable profit margin is broadly consistent with the overreporting of materials
and the underreporting of labor expenditures documented above. In the right panel, we
see the corresponding upward shift in the average reported taxable profit, which jumps
by about e60,000 at the LTU notch. This evidence is consistent with the reporting effect
associated to the LTU, as there is no change in the tax schedule at the threshold.
Figure 5b shows average reported value added as a percentage of revenue (left) and
in million euros (right). This variable is a good proxy for the tax base of the VAT at
the firm level.42 We observe a large break at the LTU threshold, with an upward shift
from approximately 20% to 23%, indicating that firms monitored by the LTU report a
substantially higher value-added tax base. As in the previous graph, the patterns are very
different even far from the LTU threshold, suggesting that they are not due to selection
40 Additionally, Figure A.14 plots average reported inputs for two polar cases: wholesale (low labor
intensity, high bunching) and retail (high labor intensity, low bunching). Within both sectors, we observe
large breaks in the distribution of reported inputs, in large with the general patterns.
41 We can only calculate the taxable profit margin for firms with positive taxable profits, because firms
with negative profits report a zero tax liability. This implies restricting the sample to 80% of its size. All
results presented in the paper are robust to using only the subsample of firms with positive tax liability.
42 This measure of value added is calculated by the Banco de España as the difference between
operating revenue and expenses that are considered part of the VAT base.
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created by the bunching response. By failing to report the correct tax base, firms outside
the scope of the LTU are taking advantage of their role as fiscal intermediaries to keep
part of the tax revenue that they should remit to the tax authority.
The tax base of the payroll tax is best approximated by the net wage bill. In Spain,
the payroll tax consists of a combination of employer contributions (31% of the net
wage in the period we study) and employee contributions (7% of the net wage). In the
data, we separately observe the net wage bill and the employers’ part of the payroll
tax. As discussed above, Figure 4b shows a shift in average net wages as a fraction of
reported revenue from 10.5% to 11.5% at the LTU threshold. Once again, there are two
significantly different patterns on either side of the notch, suggesting that firms monitored
by the LTU have a lower ability to misreport their payroll tax base than those below.43
Taking the evidence on the three tax bases together, the empirical patterns depict
a persistent tax regime shift associated to an arbitrary nominal threshold over a long
period of time (1995-2007). This evidence suggests that the LTU effectively increases
tax compliance on the subset of firms that it monitors. Firms below the LTU threshold,
including both bunchers and low productivity firms, seem to have more leeway to evade
taxes. On average, firms under stricter tax enforcement engage in less misreporting and
the LTU policy is therefore equivalent to a broadening of reported tax bases. At a general
level, we conclude that the deterrence channel is more effective at reducing evasion when
the tax authority has more resources to monitor the information trails making full use of
the enforcement technology.
6 Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications
We use the baseline model to examine analytically the welfare effects of increasing tax
enforcement on firms. First, we analyze the net welfare change from increasing monitor-
ing effort across firms and returning the additional revenue lump sum to all taxpayers.
Second, we examine the mechanisms and conditions under which size-dependent tax en-
forcement is a welfare-improving policy. Finally, we use the analytical insights and the
empirical results on the Spanish LTU to illustrate the potential welfare gains of extending
stricter tax enforcement to medium-sized and small firms.
6.1 Welfare Effects of Increasing Tax Enforcement
Consider the baseline economy introduced in section 2. Without loss of generality, assume
that each firm is owned by one individual whose total income is the net-of-tax profit of
the firm. The government devotes fixed costs F to create a tax authority in charge of
43 As a robustness check, Figures A.15 and A.16 in the online appendix replicate the evidence for
reported CIT and VAT bases for five broad sectors of activity. These results indicate that the tax-
reporting regime shift observed in the aggregate data is not due to a systematic correlation between the
strength of the bunching response and the sectoral composition of that response.
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tax enforcement with a given technology. The tax authority spends c(φ) resources per
taxpayer to employ qualified staff to examine the discrepancies detected by the enforce-
ment technology and undertake tax audits to uncover evasion. The administrative costs
of tax enforcement, AC(φ) = F+ c(φ), are increasing and convex (cφ, cφφ > 0) in moni-
toring effort, which is assumed constant across firms in this baseline model. The social
welfare function that aggregates expected profits by firms and expected tax revenue by
the government, net of administrative costs of enforcement, is given by
EW ≡
ˆ ymax
ymin
{(1− t)P − qz − κ(u) + tur} ·g0(y)dy
+
ˆ ymax
ymin
{t(P − u) + φh(u)tu(1 + θ)} ·g0(y)dy − AC(φ). (14)
By the envelope condition, the increase in monitoring effort has only a mechanical
first-order effect on the firms’ expected profits, because firms have already made their
real and reporting choices. The marginal change in welfare in response to an increase in
monitoring effort is, therefore,
dEW
dφ
=
ˆ ymax
ymin
[
t
dP
dφ
+ tφ(1 + θ)
(
∂h
∂u
du
dφ
u+ h(u)
du
dφ
)]
·g0(y)dy − cφ(φ)
=
ˆ ymax
ymin
[
t
dP
dφ
− κu(u)du
dφ
]
·g0(y)dy − cφ(φ), (15)
where the second equality follows from firms’ first order condition of net-of-tax profit
maximization with respect to concealed revenue. Comparative statics indicate that the
increase in monitoring effort without changing the relative cost of inputs does not mod-
ify the demand for inputs and thus it does not affect real production, dP/dφ = 0.44
Arranging terms, we obtain a condition showing that increasing tax enforcement is a
welfare-improving policy when the marginal welfare gains from a lower level of tax eva-
sion are larger than the marginal administrative costs of achieving that level, such that
ˆ ymax
ymin
[
−κu (u) · du
dφ
]
· g0 (y) dy > cφ (φ) . (16)
This expression indicates that the welfare gains of increasing tax enforcement depend
positively on i) the marginal resource costs of evasion, κu(u), because the more costly
evasion is the larger the gains of reducing it; and ii) the reduction in misreported income
due to the increase in monitoring effort. The welfare gains are negatively related with
the initial monitoring effort, φ, due to convex administrative costs, indicating that there
44 Our empirical results for the Spanish LTU support this prediction as we do not find any evidence
of real responses (i.e. fall of production) to the change in monitoring effort.
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are decreasing returns to increasing tax enforcement.
Condition (16) is derived according to the procedure followed in Chetty (2009a) to
obtain the generalization of Feldstein (1999)’s condition to examine the excess burden of
taxation. In contrast to raising marginal tax rates, increasing monitoring effort does not
affect relative input prices and thus it broadens reported tax bases without distorting pro-
duction. Indeed, a higher monitoring effort lowers the returns to misreporting tax bases,
yielding direct welfare gains through the reduction in resource costs and a redistributive
effect by transferring income among taxpayers. Note that the welfare gains from raising
tax enforcement could be even larger if the extra revenues obtained were used to fund
valuable public spending or to decrease corporate income tax rates. The latter possibility
would reduce the excess burden of taxation, justifying an expansion of the tax agency’s
resources as discussed in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987).
The conditions derived in the extended model with heterogeneous firms (discussed in
section 2.2) show that firms respond differently to increases in tax enforcement because
i) monitoring effort is more effective on firms whose transactions are easier to trace; and
ii) the costs of misreporting transactions can be heterogeneous across firms, to the point
that some taxpayers do not react to avoid higher enforcement. Given these insights and
condition (16), we can infer that welfare gains from increasing tax enforcement would be
higher in economies with a large proportion of upstream firms because their misreported
transactions are more likely to be detected.
6.2 Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement
Most governments around the world have established LTUs within their tax agencies to
strengthen tax administration and improve tax compliance by the largest taxpayers, often
by recommendation of the IMF (IMF, 2002). Despite the widespread adoption of this
policy in recent decades, there have been very few attempts to evaluate its welfare effects
beyond noting that it has been generally successful at increasing total tax revenue. In
practice, there is variation across countries in the specific eligibility criteria, which usually
include either total revenue, number of employees, or both. However, the overarching
feature of LTUs is that they lead to size-dependent tax enforcement intensity by applying
higher monitoring effort per taxpayer to a subset of large firms (OECD, 2011).
We develop a framework to analyze the welfare implications of the policy, taking
into account the local distortions generated by bunching to avoid the LTU and also the
behavioral responses within the LTU. Using this framework and the estimates from our
empirical application, we do a simple welfare calculation of the effects of the Spanish LTU
to illustrate the potential welfare gains associated to extending stricter tax enforcement
to smaller firms.
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Given the social welfare function defined by (14), the welfare change induced by the
LTU with an eligibility threshold yL is given by
∆EW =
ˆ yL+dyM
yL
[
∆ΠR + ∆u · κu (u)
] · (1− α(y)) · g0(y)dy +
+
ˆ yL+dyM
yL
[∆u · κu (u)] · α(y) · g0(y)dy +
+
ˆ ymax
yL+dyM
[∆u · κu (u)] · g0(y)dy + (17)
+
ˆ ymax
yL+dyM
[c(φ1)− c(φ0)] · g0(y)dy
where ∆ΠR is the change in gross profits (i.e., ΠR = P − qz) and ∆u is the change in
reported tax base, both changes induced by the increase in monitoring effort; and α(y)
is the proportion of non-optimizers at each level of pre-LTU reported revenue.
The welfare change associated to a size-dependent tax enforcement policy is thus
the result of four components. The first one captures the local welfare loss created by
the bunchers’ reaction. Bunchers reduce their reported revenue creating welfare losses
through the additional resource costs (evasion channel) and/or the reduction in output
(real channel). The second component measures the welfare gains due to the adjustment
costs that prevent some firms from bunching. These non-nonbunchers report larger tax
bases, reducing their resource costs of evasion. Similarly, the third component captures
the positive welfare gains of the LTU’s deterrence on high productivity firms, which
report larger tax bases and hence incur lower resource costs. Although firms monitored
by the LTU are worse off because they pay more taxes, this income is a transfer to the
government that does not affect aggregate welfare. The key mechanism to obtain welfare
gains is the reduction in the resource costs associated to evasion. The final component is
the additional administrative costs needed to increase monitoring effort for firms within
the LTU. Overall, the policy is welfare improving when the gains from the lower resource
costs of evasion born by firms monitored by the LTU, net of the administrative costs, are
higher than the local welfare costs created by the bunchers’ reaction.
6.3 Welfare Calculations: Application to the Spanish LTU
We evaluate now the welfare effect of expanding the scope of the LTU to one additional
firm, using the insights from equations (16) and (17) and the empirical results from our
application for the Spanish LTU. Framing the question as a marginal reform from the
status quo is a simple way to explore the existence of potential marginal net welfare
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gains of the policy.45 Given our analysis, extending the LTU’s monitoring effort to an
additional firm would be welfare improving if the reduction in resource costs is higher than
the additional administrative costs required, given some local welfare losses associated to
bunching. The existence of substantial net welfare gains at the margin would indicate the
efficiency of spending additional monitoring resources on smaller firms, and also suggest
the presence of sizable welfare gains in the interior of the LTU.
The marginal resource cost of evasion is a critical measure to evaluate the welfare
gains of extending the policy but, as discussed by Chetty (2009a), its estimation is quite
challenging. We propose a method to put bounds on this measure by looking at tax
reporting behavior by firms in the short-range region above the LTU notch
(
yL, yD
)
, de-
fined in section 2.2, where firms only locate if they face large adjustment costs. Assuming
that these costs are pure resource costs of evasion,46 we estimate that non-bunchers in
the region
(
yL, yD
)
report on average an additional one percentage point in taxable profit
margin than firms under lower monitoring effort.47 Over the period of analysis, firms in
that region report on average an additional e60,000 of taxable profits which, at a 32.5%
tax rate, result in e19,500 of taxes that they could avoid paying by simply reporting e1
less in total revenue. This suggests that these firms bear resource costs of at least 5.9%
of their gross income (note that average gross taxable profit for firms around the LTU
threshold is e330,000), which prevent them from reacting. Given the shift in the average
taxable profits, the inclusion of an additional firm in the LTU would yield a welfare gain
of e3,540, due to the reduction in resource costs of evasion.
As an alternative, taking also into account the potential tax savings in multiple taxes
such as the PRT (1pp of tax base shift under a 38% tax rate representing e22,800 of tax
liability) and the VAT (3pp of tax base shift at 11.5% of effective tax rate over the period
resulting in an additional e20,700 tax remittance), the marginal resource costs could be
as large as 19% of their gross income. Given the average increase in reported tax bases
of approximately e300,000, the welfare gain generated by marginally extending the LTU
45Conducting a welfare evaluation of the LTU policy as a whole would require making very strong
assumptions about how the local estimates obtained at the threshold extrapolate to the full range of
firms. That exercise would incorporate a much larger degree of uncertainty than the one we develop here.
For that reason, we just provide back-of-the-envelope calculations of the marginal benefit of extending
the LTU and the inferred revenue threshold where these benefits are exhausted. See Kanbur and Keen
(2014) and Bigio and Zilberman (2011) for an analytical discussion on the complexity of determining
optimal tax thresholds.
46 If firms do not react because of misperception about tax enforcement strategies, the proposed bounds
would be biased upwards. However, the proposed measure captures other costs such as managerial effort
to understand the effects of the policy, resources devoted to keeping double accounting, violation of
ethical principles, or foregoing business opportunities to maintain an inefficiently small size.
47 As discussed in section 5.3, the parallel reporting regime shift of 1pp in the corporate income tax
base is documented well beyond the revenue region affected by selection. Besides, evidence suggests that
on average bunchers mimic tax reporting by small firms, making the 1pp gap stable in the whole revenue
interval we study.
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would be up to e57,000 in the most optimistic scenario. The bounds on the marginal
resource costs of evasion (5.9%-19%) put our estimates in the same order of magnitude
as the ones obtained by Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and Peter (2009) in a study
about the Russian flat tax reform.
To quantify the marginal administrative cost of including one additional firm in the
LTU, we need to estimate the average additional cost per taxpayer associated to the
monitoring effort of the LTU, that is c(φ1)− c(φ0). According to official data published
by the Spanish tax agency (AEAT, 1995-2007; Tribunal de Cuentas, 2008), over the period
of analysis the LTU has been endowed with 125 highly-qualified tax auditors earning an
average annual compensation between e60,000 and e80,000.48 This group of auditors
is in charge of monitoring the approximately 30,000 firms in the LTU Census. Hence,
we can approximate the additional cost per taxpayer in the LTU to be in the range of
e250-e333.49 The small magnitude of the marginal cost per taxpayer illustrates the
potential gains of exploiting the fixed-cost structure of the tax agency by extending strict
monitoring effort to smaller firms below the current LTU eligibility threshold.50
Our simple calculations show that marginally extending the scope of the LTU would
create substantial net welfare gains by reducing resource costs of evasion in a magnitude
much larger than the additional administrative costs required. This gap is due to the
non-exhausted complementarity between monitoring effort and enforcement technology
that leads to higher tax compliance induced by the threat of audit. Once the fixed-cost
investment of setting up a tax enforcement technology has been made, the marginal cost
of increasing human resources to exploit all the available information is relatively low and
reduces the administrative costs of tax enforcement per taxpayer.
The existence of significant welfare gains at the margin also suggests the presence
of sizable welfare gains in the interior of the LTU. As discussed in section 5.3, the LTU
creates a tax compliance effect on large firms well above the threshold, implying significant
increases of tax bases (in euros) and thus creating substantial welfare gains. Given the
small magnitude of the local welfare costs and the low additional administrative costs
of creating the LTU, the evidence suggests that the Spanish LTU has been effective at
48 These figures correspond to 2007, the last year in our period of analysis. The average annual
compensation of LTU tax auditors was lower in nominal terms in the earlier years, but we take the
largest numbers to obtain a conservative estimate of the administrative cost of extending the LTU.
49 Again, this is a conservative estimate because we are assuming that the marginal cost of including
one additional taxpayer with reported revenue just below e6 million in the LTU census is equal to the
average cost of monitoring taxpayers with reported revenue above that level.
50 Official reports (AEAT, 1995-2007) show that tax auditors in the LTU perform intensive verifications
on approximately 11% of LTU firms each year (i.e., roughly over 3,000 firms), mainly through electronic
notifications from cross-checkings of information sources. As an example of the potential tax revenue
gains of the policy, official statistics indicate that in 2004 the direct effect of the LTU monitoring through
verifications yielded more than e800 million in additional tax revenue, to which we should add the indirect
impact on other non-audited taxpayers’ behavior due to the threat of audit effect.
31
increasing tax revenue capacity and also at raising welfare.51
Optimal Threshold. One natural question given the above analysis is what would
be the optimal revenue level of the LTU threshold. We perform some back-of-the-envelope
calculations here, which require making a number of strong assumptions. First, we assume
that marginal resource costs (κu ≈ 0.059), marginal administrative costs (cφ ≈ e333),
and the percentage change in reported taxable income induced by the LTU’s change in
monitoring effort (∆u
y
≈ 1%) are the same at all levels of reported revenue. Given these
assumptions, we can easily calculate the revenue threshold at which the benefits of stricter
tax enforcement would be exhausted at the point where ∆u · κu = cφ. Substituting-in
the assumed values, we have 0.01y∗ · 0.059 = e333, and therefore y∗ = e564,400.
As an alternative, using the upper bound of the marginal resource costs (19%) yields a
reported revenue threshold where welfare gains are exhausted at e175,200 (i.e. potential
tax savings in CIT, PRT and VAT by marginal resource costs equal the marginal admin-
istrative costs of e333). The expansion of the LTU monitoring effort would thus require
extending stricter monitoring to 197,000 and 383,000 additional firms, respectively.52
There is, of course, substantial uncertainty about the exact location of the optimal
threshold, because it depends on strong assumptions and on extrapolation of our inher-
ently local estimates. Nevertheless, these simple calculations are useful to illustrate the
scope that governments have to extend their tax revenue capacity when they have already
incurred the fixed cost of setting up a modern tax enforcement technology. Indeed, many
LTUs designed to target large taxpayers may not be exploiting the economies of scale
associated to extending stricter monitoring to smaller firms. On the other hand, notice
that our calculations indicate that applying high monitoring effort to all small firms is
not welfare-maximizing, as the estimated optimal thresholds exclude the vast majority
of firms (80% or 60%, depending on the estimates chosen) from the LTU.53 Finally, note
that the insights raised in this analytical framework are applicable to the design of LTUs
and other size-dependent enforcement policies around the world, adjusted to the specific
51 According to official data (AEAT, 1995-2007), the additional administrative costs devoted to the
Spanish LTU are on average e7.5-e10 million per year. Assuming a full evasion response of the bunchers
(on average 250 firms per year) that on average misreport revenue by e300,000, implies that the local
welfare costs are in the range of e4.42-e14.25 million, given the discussed bounds on the marginal
resource costs of evasion. The observed tax base reporting regime shift above the threshold more than
compensates for these losses.
52The calculations use firm-level data for 2007. Under the lower (upper) bound of marginal resource
costs, this expansion would require hiring about 816 (1,595) tax auditors, with an expected annual cost
of e65 (e128) million. This expansion would also require increasing the fixed-costs of the tax agency
(e.g., buildings needed to locate new auditors) that are difficult to estimate, but could potentially be
funded with the additional revenue raised by the LTU.
53This is consistent with the insights from the theoretical work by Dharmapala, Slemrod and Wilson
(2011), who show that when there are high per-firm administrative costs of taxation and compliance
costs for businesses, it may be optimal to exclude small firms from taxation.
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conditions of each context of analysis.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on
firms’ tax compliance and the welfare implications of this type of policy. We first derive
theoretical predictions on how firms respond to increases in the resources used by the tax
authority to verify the transactions reported by firms. Then, we test the predictions of
the model using quasi-experimental variation in monitoring effort provided by the Large
Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain.
The empirical results show that firms react to avoid being under stricter tax en-
forcement by reducing their reported revenue to bunch just below the LTU eligibility
threshold. This response is heterogeneous across firms depending on the traceability of
their transactions, suggesting that monitoring effort and information requirements are
complementary to increase tax compliance. In particular, we find a larger bunching re-
sponse in sectors that sell a large share of intermediate goods, where information trails
are easier to verify by using more monitoring resources. Finally, we document that firms
monitored by the LTU report larger tax bases, indicating that the policy is effective at
reducing tax evasion. In contrast, small firms outside the LTU’s radar have wide scope
to misreport both labor and material expenditures to evade multiple taxes because of the
low monitoring effort applied to them.
Incorporating these empirical findings into a welfare calculation, we conclude that
devoting additional resources to extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller firms would
generate net welfare gains at the margin. Back-of-the-envelope calculations of the opti-
mal tax-enforcement threshold indicate that the optimal LTU threshold would be lower
than the current one in Spain, but it would still leave a substantial fraction of small
firms outside of the LTU. The general analytical framework presented here can be easily
adapted to study the welfare consequences of LTUs and size-dependent tax enforcement
policies more generally in other settings.
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Figures
Figure 1: Theoretical Distribution of Reported Revenue
(a) Baseline Model
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(b) Model with Heterogeneous Firms
! Density!
Reported!Revenue!
Density!with!LTU!Density!without!LTU!
Missing!mass!(H)!!
Bunching!mass!(B)!!
Non?response!due!to!adjustment!costs! Non?response!due!!to!heterogeneity!
Dominated!!Region!
!! !!! ! !! + !!!! !
Increase!in!reported!revenue!Δ!/Δ!!
Notes: this figure depicts the theoretical revenue distribution before and after the introduction of the
Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU). Without the LTU, all firms face the same monitoring effort and the
distribution of revenue is smoothly decreasing as depicted by the dashed (brown) line. When the LTU is
introduced, firms reporting revenue above yL face a higher enforcement intensity. A group of firms in an
interval above yL respond to the new policy by underreporting more of their revenue to report exactly
y¯ = yL. This generates a spike at the threshold (with excess mass B), and an area of missing mass (H)
to the right of the threshold, as depicted by the solid (blue) line. Panel (a) corresponds to the baseline
model, where monitoring effort and resource costs of evasion are the same for all firms, so all firms with
the same productivity draw respond identically to fiscal incentives. Thus, no firm locates in the interval
of length dyM to the right of the LTU threshold. Panel (b) depicts the equilibrium in the model with
heterogeneity, where a fraction of firms does not respond to the incentives due to different changes in
monitoring effort at the threshold or due to other adjustment costs.
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Figure 2: Operating Revenue Distribution (1995-2007): Observed vs. Counterfactual
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Notes: this graph shows the reported distribution of revenue (dots connected by solid blue line) and
the estimated counterfactual (orange dashed curve), using pooled data for the period 1995-2007. The
vertical red line indicates the Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) threshold (e6 million). The vertical dashed
blue lines indicate the bounds of the excluded region (ylb and yub) chosen for the estimation of
the counterfactual. To determine the value of yub, we fit a 5th-degree polynomial to the true
density in multiple iterations, starting with yub ≈ yL and increasing the value in small steps
until we reach a point where the bunching mass (B) equals the missing mass (H), so that
the integration constraint is satisfied. The average bunching parameter (bav) estimates the
adjustment in reported revenue for the average firm above the threshold, while (badj) estimates
the adjustment for the marginal bunching firm, accounting for the existence of resource costs
of evasion that prevent some firms from responding to the notch. The bins are e60,101 wide,
delimited such that no bin contains data both to the left and to the right of the relevant policy
thresholds. The total number of observations is 285,570.
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Figure 3: Average Bunching by Share of Final Consumer Sales
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Notes: the bunching measure b̂av is calculated for each sector as explained in section 3 in the main text.
Final consumption as a share of total sales in each sector is calculated using the year 2000 input-output
tables for the Spanish economy, published by the National Statistics Institute (INE). More details about
this data source are provided in online appendix D. The figure shows a negative relationship between the
average bunching response (bav) and the percentage of sales made to final consumers in each sector. The
slope coefficient reported is obtained by estimating a simple linear regression of the bunching estimates
on final consumption share in each sector, using robust standard errors. See Table 3 for regressions with
additional controls.
Figure 4: Reported Input Expenditures
(a) Material Expenditures (b) Labor Expenditures
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Notes: these graphs show the average ratio of input expenditures as a proportion of revenue (vertical
axes) against reported revenue (horizontal axes), for the period 1995-2007. “Material expenditures”
includes all the intermediate inputs used by the firm for production. “Labor expenditures” is the total
wage bill of the firm, excluding employee-contributed payroll taxes (social security contributions). The
dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU threshold. The dotted lines denote bin averages and the
gray dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of
extreme values, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning
that we set those values equal to the first and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in
the range y ∈ (3, 9) million. (Bin width= e120,202).
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Figure 5: Reported Tax Bases
(a) Taxable Profits: Tax Base of the Corporate Income Tax
4
5
6
7
8
Ta
xa
ble
 P
ro
fit 
M
ar
gin
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Ta
xa
ble
 P
ro
fit 
(m
illi
on
 e
ur
os
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
(b) Value Added: Tax Base of the VAT
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Notes: these graphs show the average tax bases reported by firms in the revenue interval y ∈ (3, 9)
million. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the gray dashed lines show 95% confidence
intervals for each bin average. Panel (a) shows the reported average taxable profits as a percentage of
total revenue (left) and in million euros (right). Since taxable profits are not directly reported in the
data, we calculate them out using the corporate income tax liability reported by firms in their financial
schedule and apply the tax schedule. Note that this calculation can only be made for firms with a positive
tax liability, which in this period were more than 80% of all firms in the sample. Panel (b) shows average
reported value added as a percentage of total revenue (left) and in million euros (right). This is the tax
base of the VAT. Note that the base of the payroll tax is the wage bill, shown in Figure 4b. To avoid the
spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome
variable, meaning that we set those values equal to the first and 99th percentile. We do this for each
e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million. (Bin width= e120,202).
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Tables
Table 1: Bunching Estimations by Year
Bunching Estimators # of Firms Excl. Interval Obs.
bav badj B H ylb yub N
Pooled data
1995-2007 0.121 0.382 3191 2965 5.70 6.53 285,570
(0.007)*** (0.036)***
Annual data
1995 0.089 0.257 82 77 5.70 6.56 10,207
(0.019)*** (0.079)***
1996 0.099 0.395 98 91 5.70 6.38 11,014
(0.014)*** (0.111)***
1997 0.171 0.515 186 183 5.70 6.59 12,516
(0.022)*** (0.118)***
1998 0.163 0.351 198 185 5.70 6.53 14,310
(0.024)*** (0.077)***
1999 0.172 0.416 218 203 5.70 6.68 15,835
(0.026)*** (0.097)***
2000 0.194 0.660 273 251 5.70 6.80 17,923
(0.025)*** (0.166)***
2001 0.130 0.350 229 214 5.70 6.59 21,030
(0.018)*** (0.073)***
2002 0.078 0.410 168 151 5.70 6.38 23,977
(0.010)*** (0.109)***
2003 0.102 0.348 249 254 5.70 6.41 26,759
(0.014)*** (0.080)***
2004 0.147 0.550 382 356 5.70 6.86 29,779
(0.018)*** (0.132)***
2005 0.110 0.321 382 376 5.70 6.47 33,342
(0.010)*** (0.045)***
2006 0.095 0.298 373 342 5.70 6.35 35,788
(0.009)*** (0.044)***
2007 0.099 0.305 336 310 5.70 6.50 33,090
(0.011)*** (0.053)***
Notes: bav is the average bunching response and badj is the marginal buncher’s response taking into
account resource costs of evasion (both measured in million euros). Bootstrapped standard errors are
shown below each estimate in parenthesis. B is the number of firms above the counterfactual density of
revenue in the range y ∈ (ylb, yL), where y is revenue, ylb is the lower bound of the excluded region (used
to construct the counterfactual) and yL is the LTU threshold of e6 million. H is the missing number of
firms below the counterfactual density in the range y ∈ (yL, yub), where yub is the upper bound of the
excluded region. The upper and lower bounds of the excluded interval, (ylb, yub) are also reported. For all
years, the counterfactual density is estimated using a 5th-degree polynomial. Finally, N is the number of
observations included in the estimations, i.e. the number of firms with revenue y ∈(e3.01,e9.01) million
in each year. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 2: Bunching Estimations, by Sector of Activity
Bunching Estimators # of Firms Excl. Interval Obs.
bav badj B H ylb yub N
Primary Sector 0.118 1.301 40 37 5.70 6.53 4,120
(0.034)*** (21.917)
Manuf. Food and Beverages 0.109 0.533 105 108 5.70 6.89 10,100
(0.023)*** (0.320)**
Manuf. Non Metals 0.095 0.245 97 89 5.70 6.29 9,415
(0.014)*** (0.050)***
Manuf. Metals 0.154 0.528 115 103 5.70 6.47 8,262
(0.023)*** (0.152)***
Manuf. Equipment 0.127 0.300 73 67 5.70 6.68 6,137
(0.029)*** (0.107)***
Manuf. Others 0.089 0.291 142 128 5.70 6.53 18,818
(0.016)*** (0.079)***
Construction of Buildings 0.098 0.478 272 251 5.70 6.62 29,070
(0.011)*** (0.105)***
Specialized Constr. Activ. 0.203 0.496 180 170 5.70 6.74 11,838
(0.025)*** (0.097)***
Motor Vehicles 0.077 0.361 118 107 5.70 6.41 13,118
(0.009)*** (0.077)***
Wholesale (exc. Motor V.) 0.138 0.342 986 939 5.70 6.47 72,865
(0.008)*** (0.029)***
Transportation 0.161 0.485 177 161 5.70 6.80 13,025
(0.023)*** (0.124)***
Retail Trade 0.081 0.283 155 146 5.70 6.29 22,053
(0.011)*** (0.061)***
Restaurants and Hotels 0.095 0.470 64 59 5.70 6.74 7,868
(0.028)*** (0.389)
Cultural Activities 0.082 0.393 38 37 5.70 6.38 5,397
(0.027)*** (0.439)
Real Estate 0.083 0.952 38 36 5.70 6.38 4,829
(0.022)*** (5.939)
Other Services 0.091 0.326 146 147 5.70 6.53 16,799
(0.012)*** (0.071)***
Notes: bav is the average bunching response and badj is the marginal buncher’s response taking into
account resource costs of evasion (both measured in million euros). Bootstrapped standard errors are
shown below each estimate in parenthesis. B is the number of firms above the counterfactual density of
revenue in the range y ∈ (ylb, yL), where y is revenue, ylb is the lower bound of the excluded region (used
to construct the counterfactual) and yL is the LTU threshold of e6 million. H is the missing number of
firms below the counterfactual density in the range y ∈ (yL, yub), where yub is the upper bound of the
excluded region. The upper and lower bounds of the excluded interval, (ylb, yub) are also reported. For all
years, the counterfactual density is estimated using a 5th-degree polynomial. Finally, N is the number of
observations included in the estimations, i.e. the number of firms with revenue y ∈(e3.01,e9.01) million
in each year. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 3: Determinants of Average Bunching Response
(a) Ordinary Least Squares Regressions
Dependent variable: Average Bunching (bav)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Final Consumer Sales -0.072 -0.071 -0.070 -0.053 -0.068 -0.054
(0.027)** (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.023)**
Number of Employees (median) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangible Fixed Assets (median) -0.023 -0.023 0.001
(0.025) (0.026) (0.037)
Share of Non-Bunchers (α) -0.124 -0.116
(0.070) (0.107)
Constant 0.133 0.122 0.143 0.194 0.132 0.192
(0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.023)*** (0.041)*** (0.026)*** (0.051)***
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16
R-squared 0.286 0.301 0.319 0.400 0.336 0.401
Notes: All regressions are estimated by OLS. The unit of observation is the sector of activity (for details
on the definition of the 16 sectors, see online appendix D). The median number of employees in each
sector refers to full-time-equivalent (FTE). Tangible fixed assets are measured in million euros. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
(b) Weighted Least Squares Regressions
Dependent variable: Average Bunching (bav)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Final Consumer Sales -0.049 -0.051 -0.050 -0.035 -0.051 -0.038
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)** (0.015)*** (0.015)**
Number of Employees (median) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangible Fixed Assets (median) -0.021 -0.019 0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Share of Non-Bunchers (α) -0.188 -0.191
(0.043)*** (0.044)***
Constant 0.121 0.127 0.128 0.225 0.130 0.244
(0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.025)*** (0.011)*** (0.029)***
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16
Notes: All regressions are estimated by Weighted Least Squares. The unit of observation is the sector
of activity (for details on the definition of the 16 sectors, see online appendix D). The weights are the
inverse of the variance of the bunching estimates. The median number of employees in each sector
refers to full-time-equivalent (FTE). Tangible fixed assets are measured in million euros. Standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Online Appendix
Not Intended for Publication
"Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax
Compliance"
Miguel Almunia (University of Warwick)
David Lopez-Rodriguez (Banco de España)
A Corporate Evasion with Multiple Taxes
Consider a firm that produces good y combining material acquisitions m and labor n,
which are tax-deductible expenditures54 in the corporate income tax, and non-deductible
inputs z according to the production function y = ψf(m,n, z), where ψ is a productivity
parameter and f(·, ·, ·) is strictly continuous, increasing and concave in inputs use. Firm
hires in competitive markets materials at unit cost c, labor at wage rate w, and non-
deductible expenditures at unit cost q, and sell their output at the market price p, which
is normalized to unity.
Suppose the existence of value added tax (VAT) by the credit method in which firms
charge a flat tax rate tvat on their sales y and receive a credit for the monetary value
of their material expenditures e ≡ cm. Firms must transfer to the tax authority the
difference between charged and deductible VAT, that is tvat · P vat with P vat = y − e.
Government also levies linear payroll taxes on the wage bill P ss = l ≡ wn, charging tss1
on account of employers, that are tax deductible in the corporate income tax, and tss2 on
account of employers. We assume that both payroll taxes are fully born by firms. Firms
also consider the regulatory costs associated to hiring labor captured by a convex cost
function in the reported wage bill, γ(l).55 Finally, the income generated by the firm is
taxed with a proportional rate tcit on taxable profits P cit = y− e− l · (1 + tss1), so firm’s
net-of-tax income with truthful reporting is given by Π = (1−tcit)P cit−P sstss2−qz−γ(l).
Suppose that the tax authority is not able to monitor all transactions in the economy
creating incentives for firms to evade taxes by misreporting their tax bases. Consider
that an evader firm could underreport the monetary value of their revenue by an amount
uy ≡ y − y ≥ 0 , where y denotes reported revenue, to reduce taxable corporate income
and to appropriate tax revenue from the VAT. Firm may also attempt to inflate the
value of their material acquisitions, given by ue ≡ e − e ≥ 0, where e denotes reported
expenditures, to claim larger tax credits in both corporate income tax and the VAT.
Firms may have incentives to hide a share of their wage bill by an amount ul ≡ l− l ≥ 0,
where l denotes reported labor expenditures, to evade payroll taxes and save regulatory
costs of hiring labor. Given these potential evasion channels, firm’s reported tax bases in
the corporate income tax, payroll taxes and the VAT are given, respectively, by
P cit = [(y − uy)− (e+ ue)− (l − ul) · (1 + tss1)], (18)
54We make the distinction between this two tax-deductible inputs because the dataset in our empirical
application includes accurate measures of firms’ total expenditures on material acquisitions and labor
wage bill.
55The assumptions on the incidence of payroll taxes on account of employers and employees, and the
existence of regulatory costs associated to hiring workers seems particularly appropriate for the Spanish
case. As an example, Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2012) discuss the costs and rigidities imposed on
Spanish firms by multiple regulations in labor markets.
i
P ss = (l − ul), (19)
and P vat = [(y − uy)− (e+ ue)]. (20)
Evasion behavior is costly because it requires, for instance, collusion between the firm
and its trading partners and employees; the creation of parallel accounting books and
payment systems in cash; or it can imply forego business opportunities. We introduce
these resource costs of evasion by a reduced form κ(uy, ue, ul) that is an increasing, convex
and separable function in each of its arguments. The tax authority detects evasion with
probability δ = φh(uy, ue, ul), where φ is the monitoring effort parameter and the en-
forcement technology h(·) is a continuous, convex and separable function in each evasion
channel. Whenever misreporting is detected, the firm is compelled to pay back the evaded
tax plus a proportional penalty rate θ that, for simplicity, is assumed homogeneous for
all channels of evasion.
The expected profit of the firm net of corporate and payroll taxes, and augmented by
the expected appropriation of VAT revenue, is given by
EΠ = (1− tcit)[ψf(m,n, z)− e− l(1 + tss1)]− qz + tr · [uy + ue − ul(1 + tss1)]
+(tss1 + tss2) · rul + tvat · r[uy + ue]− κ(uy, ue, ul)− γ(l), (21)
where r ≡ [1−φh(uy, ue, ul)(1+θ)] is the expected rate of return of 1 euro evaded. Firms
make production and reporting decisions in order to maximize their expected profit such
that an interior optimum for firms real and evasion decisions satisfies the system of first-
order conditions given by
ψfm(m
∗, n∗, z∗) = c (22)
ψfn(m
∗, n∗, z∗) = w
[
1 + tss1 +
tss2 + γl(l
∗
)
(1− tcit)
]
(23)
ψfz(m
∗, n∗, z∗) = q/(1− t) (24)[
tcit + tvat
] · r = κuy(uy∗) + (1 + θ)φhuy(uy∗) · T̂ (25)[
tcit + tvat
] · r = κue(ue∗) + (1 + θ)φhue(ue∗) · T̂ (26)[
(tss1 + tss2)− tcit(1 + tss1)] · r + γl(l∗) = κul(ul∗) + (1 + θ)φhul(ul∗) · T̂ (27)
where T̂ ≡ [tvat·(uy∗+ue∗)+(tss1+tss2)·ul∗+tcit·(uy∗+ue∗−ul∗(1+tss1))] is the total evaded
taxes by the multiple misreporting channels. The system of optimal conditions shows that
positive tax rates on corporate income distort inputs demand decisions reducing revenue
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from potential production at zero tax rates. These conditions also indicate that the
existence of both payroll taxes and labor regulatory costs create distortions increasing
the marginal cost of hiring employees and thus reducing labor demand.
The optimal evasion conditions for each misreporting channel predict that firm evades
taxes to the point where the marginal expected return of misreporting transactions is
equal to the expected costs associated to tax evasion. The latter is the result of the
marginal resource costs born in each misreporting channel plus the deterrence effect cre-
ated by tax enforcement that results from the interaction between monitoring effort and
the enforcement technology. The systematic matching of tax returns from multiple tax-
payers implies that a marginal unit of misreporting in one channel increases the chances
of being detected, and thus paying back the total amount evaded, in multiple channels.
The expected returns of misreporting revenue and expenditures are positively related
with the tax rates. The larger the tax rates on both the VAT and the corporate income tax
are, the higher the incentives to hide revenue and inflate material acquisitions to reduce
those tax bases. Notice that when firms have scope to misreport their transactions they
do not act as fiscal intermediaries, that just transfer collected VAT to the tax agency, but
instead firms have incentives to appropriate a share of VAT revenue. Finally, the optimal
condition for hidden labor bill indicates that firms could have incentives to misreport
it when the marginal savings in payroll taxes and regulatory costs were larger than the
foregoing tax credits in corporate income tax due misreporting of labor costs. Overall,
the model identifies two channels that create positive returns for labor misreporting: i)
the existence of a significant gap between payroll taxes and corporate tax rates; and ii)
the presence of large regulatory costs associated to hiring workers.
B Anatomy of the LTU Response: Input Ratios and
Tax Bases
Consider the model with heterogeneous monitoring effort and resource costs presented
in subsection 2.2. Before the introduction of a LTU, the system of optimal conditions
indicates that the demand of tax-deductible inputs (e.g. materials and labor) is smoothly
increasing in productivity, dm/dψ > 0 and dn/dψ > 0. Hence, the reported ratios of
input expenditures over revenue, M ≡ cm/y and L ≡ wn/y, are continuous in ψ over the
range [ψ, ψ]. This implies that in the neighborhood of yL defined by the small interval
(y′, yL + dyMφ ) the average reported ratios of inputs expenditures over revenue are almost
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equal, that is,
´ yL
y′ M · g0(y)dy´ yL
y′ g0(y)dy
∼=
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
M · g0(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g0(y)dy
and
´ yL
y′ L · g0(y)dy´ yL
y′ g0(y)dy
∼=
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
L · g0(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g0(y)dy
.
(28)
Suppose the LTU is introduced. In the presence of heterogeneity in both monitoring
effort effectiveness and resource costs, there is a subset of firms in the pre-LTU density
interval (yL, yL + dyMφ ), the non-optimizers, with prohibitive resource costs to respond
reducing reported revenue. In contrast, the complementary subset of firms also located in
that interval in the pre-LTU situation, the bunchers, reduce their reported revenue to stay
below the threshold because that results in larger expected profits, i.e. EΠ0(m,n, z, u
| ψM , φ0) > EΠ1(m,n, z, u | ψM , φ1). Considering that, due to frictions, the bunchers
locate along the interval(y′, yL), the model provides different predictions on the expected
average reported ratios of input expenditures over revenue around the LTU threshold.
These predictions depend on whether bunchers’ reaction is due to real (i.e. reduction of
production) or evasion (i.e. increase of concealed revenue) responses to the enforcement
threshold.56
Real Response. Bunchers can avoid the threshold lowering their production, and
thus their inputs demand, without bearing additional resource costs of evasion. This
reaction implies that in the interval (y′, yL) below the threshold there are firms with
ψ ∈ [ψ′, ψL] that hire more inputs than bunchers with ψ ∈ [ψL, ψM ]. This causes that
both average reported ratios of expenditures over revenue are not continuous at the
threshold yL. Indeed, the real reaction of the bunchers to the LTU results in i) a downward
trend of both ratios in the interval (y′, yL); and ii) a discrete upward jump of these ratios
at the threshold such that
´ yL
y′ M · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1 (y) dy
<
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
M · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
and
´ yL
y′ L · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
<
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
L · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
.
(29)
Evasion Response. Bunchers can avoid the threshold increasing their concealed
revenue, and thus without modifying their inputs demand, paying resource costs of ad-
ditional evasion. This response implies that in the interval (y′, yL) below the threshold
firms with ψ ∈ [ψ′, ψL] hire lower inputs than bunchers with ψ ∈ [ψL, ψM ]. The evasion
response of the bunchers thus creates i) an upward trend of the average reported ratios
56The bunchers’ reaction to the LTU threshold could be a combination of both potential responses,
real and evasion, but we discuss the two polar responses for analytical simplicity. This simplification
provides predictions on the expected average patterns of input ratios around the threshold when the
reaction is dominated by either the real or the evasion channel.
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of expenditures in the interval (y′, yL); and ii) a discontinuous downward jump of these
ratios at the threshold such that
´ yL
y′ M · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
>
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
M · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
and
´ yL
y′ L · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
>
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
L · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
.
(30)
Evasion Response with Inputs Misreporting. Considering the extended model
with inputs misreporting and multiple taxes presented above (Appendix B), evader firms
have incentives to i) inflate their material acquisitions in an amount ue to claim larger
tax credits in both the VAT and the CIT; and ii) hide part of their wage bill, ul, to save
both payroll taxes and the regulatory costs of labor. The optimal amount of evasion in
each expenditure channel is heterogeneous among firms because it depends negatively on
the effectiveness of monitoring effort and the resource cost of evasion. Firms thus have
larger incentives to avoid stricter tax enforcement when their expenditures misreporting
is higher in the pre-LTU situation (i.e. larger expected profits of bunching). Bunchers
that react to avoid the LTU increasing their concealed revenue therefore also report a
higher (lower) proportion of materials (labor) to evade taxes than firms with ψ ∈ [ψ′, ψL]
also located in the interval (y′, yL). Define the ratios of reported inputs expenditures over
revenue with inputs misreporting byM ≡ (cm+ue)/y and L ≡ (wn−ul)/y, respectively.
The evasion response of bunchers that also misreport expenditures in a larger proportion
creates i) an upward (downward) trend of the average ratio of materials (labor) in the
interval (y′, yL); and ii) a downward (upward) jump of the materials (labor) ratio at the
threshold such that
´ yL
y′ M · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
>>
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
M · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
and
´ yL
y′ L · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
<
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
L · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
.
(31)
LTU Effectiveness: Tax Bases. High productivity firms that are in the interior
of the LTU have lower scope to evade taxes when the LTU is effective (dφ > 0). The
extended model predicts that these firms reduce concealed outcome, uy, inflated materials,
ue, and hidden wage bill, ul, in a magnitude that depends on the effectiveness of the LTU.
An effective LTU thus raises the reported tax bases of the corporate income tax, P cit,
the payroll tax, P ss, and the value-added tax, P vat, with a break at the LTU threshold
creating i) a downward trend of the average tax bases in the interval (y′, yL) due to
bunchers’ misreporting; and ii) an upward parallel shift of tax bases for high productivity
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firms such that ´ yL
y′ P
cit · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
<<
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
P cit · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
, (32)
´ yL
y′ P
ss · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
<<
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
P ss · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
, (33)
´ yL
y′ P
vat · g1(y)dy´ yL
y′ g1(y)dy
<<
´ yL+dyMφ
yL
P vat · g1(y)dy´ yL+dyMφ
yL
g1(y)dy
. (34)
C Additional Institutional Background
LTU Eligibility Rule
The Spanish Tax Authority fixes a yearly revenue criteria to allocate firms under LTU
monitoring. In particular, firms report to the tax agency their total revenue of year t
in January of t + 1 when their annual VAT summary must be submitted. Firms with
revenue in year t that exceeds the e6.01 million threshold are monitored by the LTU
since t + 1, and the LTU is also in charge of reviewing all their tax returns from year
t (e.g. CIT, VAT, wages withholding). Similarly, if revenue falls below the threshold in
year s, the firm is removed from the LTU census in s+ 1 and tax returns from year s are
not monitored by the LTU.
Groups
According to Spanish tax and business laws, there are two types of business groups: cor-
porate groups and consolidated fiscal groups. The latter are more narrowly defined than
the former, which require sharing the same activity and that the dominant firm owns at
least 75% of the subsidiary’s capital (see article 67 of the Royal Decree 4/2004 of the CIT
for details). The LTU’s revenue criterion refers to individual legal entities or consolidated
fiscal groups (article 121 of the VAT Law), not to corporate groups. Therefore, a firm
with annual revenue below e6.01 million that belongs to a large corporate group will not
be included in the LTU census, but it would be included if it were part of a consolidated
fiscal group. Note that consolidated fiscal groups are typically formed by the largest cor-
porations, whereas corporate groups are more common. We do not have access to data
on which firms belong to fiscal groups, but according to the Statistics published by the
Spanish Tax Authority from 2004 to 2007, less than 1% of firms in the revenue range
e1.5-e6 million are considered part of the LTU due to belonging to fiscal groups. Since
this is a very small share, we do not expect that including these firms in the analysis will
introduce a noticeable bias in our bunching estimates.
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Exceptions to LTU Eligibility Rule
Exporting firms that claim a VAT refund are automatically included in the LTU census,
regardless of their operating revenue. We do not have data on VAT claims related to
exports that allows us to identify these firms accurately, so we cannot exclude these firms
from the analysis nor can we use this set of firms as a comparison group.
Two regions in Spain, Navarra and País Vasco, have their own independent tax au-
thorities. Firms with headquarters located in each of these regions are monitored by
those independent tax authorities, unless they obtain more than 75% of their operating
revenue from transactions in other Spanish regions, in which case they are monitored by
the national LTU. Since we do not have information on the geographic destination of
sales at firm level, we are unable to identify which large firms in these regions are within
the LTU stricter tax monitoring. The distribution of reported revenue features modest,
but statistically significant, bunching in the two regions. We choose to exclude them from
the main analysis because of the uncertainty about how many firms are subject to the
LTU and also because they represent a small proportion (7.2%) of the total number of
firms with revenue between e3 and e9 million.
Corporate Income Tax Threshold
The standard rate in the corporate income tax was 35% of taxable profits in the period
1995-2007. A lower rate of 30% was applied to firms under a revenue threshold that was
modified over time: from e1.5 million in 1999 up to e10 million in 2010 (full details
provided in Table A.2). The cutoff for this tax break overlapped with the LTU threshold
in 2004, but was different in the rest of the years. The lower rate was applied only to the
first e90,121 of taxable profits (e120,202 since 2005) creating a notch for eligible firms
with low taxable profits, and a kink for those with high profits.
External Audit and Abbreviated Returns Threshold
Firms are required by law to have their annual accounts audited by an external private
firm if they fulfill two of the following criteria for two consecutive years: (i) annual rev-
enue above e4.75 million; (ii) total assets above e2.4 million;57 and (iii) more than 50
employees on average during the year. These criteria also determine whether a firm can
use the abbreviated form of the corporate income tax return, rather than the standard
(long) version. These requirements create compliance costs,58 and the private audit infor-
mation could complement tax enforcement. Private auditors have a legal responsibility to
communicate tax misreporting to the authorities only in the (extreme) case of detecting
57The revenue limit was originally 790 million pesetas (e4.748 million), and the assets limit was 395
million pesetas (e2.374 million).
58The yearly fee charged by private audit firms is in the range e10,000 - e30,000 for firms with revenue
close to e4.75 million, a small but non-negligible expenditure (0.2 to 0.6% of total revenue, but 4 to 12%
of reported profits on average).
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systematic fraud and criminal activities. However, they do not have to report neither
their statement nor detected accounting inconsistencies to the tax authority.
Third-Party Information Reported in Tax Returns
The tax authority introduced in the 1980’s a mandatory information form (Modelo 347 )
in which all firms, both below and above the LTU threshold, must provide detailed
information on the monetary value of their transactions with all of their suppliers and
clients. The information from these forms is processed electronically and regularly used by
tax auditors to cross-check tax returns and detect discrepancies between trading partners.
Note that we do not have access to any data from these forms.
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D Data: Further Details
Main Variables Used in the Analysis
The main variables used in our empirical analysis are: (i) annual net operating rev-
enue, which is used to determine whether firms are eligible to the LTU; (ii) material
expenditures, i.e. the cost of all raw materials and services purchased by the firm in the
production process; (iii) labor expenditures, which accounts for the total wage bill of a
firm, excluding social security contributions; (iv) number of employees; (v) accounting
profit, i.e. the gross profit reported in the CIT; (vi) actual tax liability in the CIT, and
(vii) taxable profit, which we calculate by applying the CIT schedule for firms that report
a positive CIT liability. Table A.5 reports summary statistics for all these variables.
Definition of Sectors of Activity
Table A.1 provides the sector definitions that we use in section 5.2 in terms of the 2009
version of the National Classification of Economic Activities (in Spanish, CNAE), which
follows the Eurostat standard NACE Rev. 2. We use 2-digit CNAE codes to define
sectors. The third column shows the number of firms in each sector for the 1995-2007
pooled CBB dataset, and the last column shows the percentage they represent overall.
Original CBB data and final dataset
We start from the original CBB data as provided by the Banco de España in Septem-
ber 2014. We include data for the years 1995 through 2007, both included. In order to
construct the final dataset for our analysis, we take several steps. First, we drop observa-
tions from two regions where tax collection is independent of the federal tax authority and
hence the LTU threshold does not apply (País Vasco and Navarra). Second, we choose a
bin width of e60,101, which is one-hundredth of the revenue level of the LTU threshold.
For symmetry, we keep 50 bins below and 50 bins above the threshold, so in total there
are 100 bins. Hence, our final dataset has firms with reported revenue between e3.005
million and e9.015 million. Within this range, we define some of the ratios that we use
in the section on input expenditures: materials and labor expenditures as % of revenue,
average gross wages (defined as the total wage bill divided by the number of employees),
and fixed assets as % of revenue. Finally, we drop the top and bottom 1% of observations
from each of these variables, in order to avoid the presence of outliers in the data. There
is some overlap in the extreme values, such that a firm with abnormally high materials
is likely to have abnormally low labor expenditures. The final dataset contains 285,570
observations, and summary statistics are reported on Table A.5. The Stata do-files used
to process the original data to arrive at the final dataset are available upon request.
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Input-Output Tables
We use the input-output tables produced by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica, INE ) for the year 2000. Sectors of activity are defined according
to Spanish industry classification (TSIO), which does not match CNAE 2009 codes ex-
actly but has substantial overlap. To calculate the share of sales made to final consumers
by sector, we divide the column labelled “Consumo final de los hogares, interno” (“House-
holds’ final consumption, domestic”) by the column “Total empleos” (“Total uses”). The
original table used for the calculations can be downloaded from:
www.ine.es/daco/daco42/cne00/simetrica2000.xls
The table we provide together with our main dataset contains, additionally, the cor-
respondence between our sector definitions (based on CNAE 2009 codes) and the sectors
defined in the input-output tables.
x
Appendix Figures
Figure A.1: Behavioral (Non)response at the Corporate Income Tax Threshold
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Notes: these graphs show the operating revenue distribution for different periods, around the threshold
for the corporate income tax cut for small firms. Only firms with positive taxable profits are included
(about 80% of the full sample), because the tax rate is irrelevant for them. There is no bunching at this
threshold in any year except for 2004, the year in which this cutoff overlapped with the LTU threshold
discussed in the main text. The results are essentially identical when using the full sample of firms.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Reported Revenue, by Year
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Reported Revenue, by Year (continued)
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Notes: these graphs show the operating revenue distribution for each year in the period under study
(1995-2007).
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Figure A.3: Bunching Response by Sector
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Figure A.3: Bunching Response by Sector (continued)
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Notes: these graphs show the observed and counterfactual operating revenue distribution for each sector
in the period 1995-2007. The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU threshold. The estimation
method is identical to that applied in Figure 2 and explained in the main text.
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Figure A.4: Average Bunching by Firm Size Characteristics
(a) Median Number of Employees
PrimarySector
Manuf_FoodBev
Manuf_NonMetals
Manuf_Metals
Manuf_Equipment
Manuf_Others
Construction
Specialized_Construction_Activities
MotorVehicles
WholesaleTrade
Transportation
RetailTrade
Restaurants_Hotels
CulturalActiv
RealEstate
OtherServices
Slope = .0005 (.0007)
R-squared = .02
.0
3
.0
6
.0
9
.1
2
.1
5
.1
8
.2
1
Av
er
ag
e 
Bu
nc
hin
g 
(b
_a
v)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Median Number of Employees
Average Bunching (b_av) Fitted values
(b) Median Tangible Fixed Assets
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Notes: these graphs are robustness checks for the complementarity result depicted in Figure 3. The top
panel shows average bunching against the median number of employees by sector. The bottom panel
shows average bunching against median tangible fixed assets by sector. The slope of the relationship is
close to zero and not statistically significant in either case, suggesting that firm size characteristics such
as employment or tangible assets are not strongly related to bunching behavior at the sector level.
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Figure A.5: Robustness of Complementarity Result
(a) Below (left) or Above (right) Median Number of Employees
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(b) Below (left) or Above (right) Median Tangible Fixed Assets
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Notes: these graphs are robustness checks for the complementarity result depicted in Figure 3. The top
panel shows the average bunching estimates by sector, using only firms below (left panel) and above
(right panel) the median number of employees in the overall sample. Similarly, the bottom panel shows
the average bunching estimates by sector, using only firms below (left panel) and above (right panel)
the median of tangible fixed assets in the overall sample. The slope of the relationship is negative in all
cases as in Figure 3, and it is statistically different from zero in all cases except for the firms below the
median number of employees.
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Figure A.6: Robustness of Complementarity Result to Bin Size
(a) Bin width = e30,050
PrimarySector
Manuf_FoodBev
Manuf_NonMetals
Manuf_Metals
Manuf_Equipment
Manuf_Others
Construction
Specialized_Construction_Activities
MotorVehicles
WholesaleTrade
Transportation
RetailTrade
Restaurants_Hotels
CulturalActiv RealEstate
OtherServices
Slope = -.071 (.027)
R-squared = .28
.0
3
.0
6
.0
9
.1
2
.1
5
.1
8
.2
1
Av
er
ag
e 
Bu
nc
hin
g 
(b
_a
v)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Final Consumption as % of Total Revenue
Average Bunching (b_av) Fitted values
(b) Bin width = e60,101 (as reported in Figure 3)
PrimarySector
Manuf_FoodBev
Manuf_NonMetals
Manuf_Metals
Manuf_Equipment
Manuf_Others
Construction
Specialized_Construction_Activities
MotorVehicles
WholesaleTrade
Transportation
RetailTrade
Restaurants_Hotels
CulturalActiv
RealEstate
OtherServices
Slope = -.072 (.027)
R-squared = .29
.0
3
.0
6
.0
9
.1
2
.1
5
.1
8
.2
1
Av
er
ag
e 
Bu
nc
hin
g 
(b
_a
v)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Final Consumption as % of Total Revenue
Average Bunching (b_av) Fitted values
(c) Bin width = e120,202
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Notes: these graphs are robustness checks for the complementarity result depicted in Figure 3, showing
how the results change using different bin sizes. The top panel shows the correlation between average
bunching by sector and share of final sales using a bin width of e30,050 in the bunching estimation.
The middle panel uses a bin width of e60,101 (exactly the same as Figure 3). The bottom panel uses
a bin width of e120,202. The slope of the relationship is negative and significant in all cases, and the
magnitude is very similar.
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Figure A.7: Firm Size Distribution by Quartile of Employment
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Notes: these graphs show the observed and counterfactual operating revenue distribution by quartiles
of the employment distribution in the period 1995-2007. We divide all firms in the sample into four
quartiles based on the employment distribution. Q1 = 0-9 employees; Q2 = 10-21 employees; Q3 = 22-
38 employees; Q4 = 39 or more employees. The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU threshold.
The estimation method is identical to that applied in Figure 2 and explained in the main text. (Bin
width= e60,101).
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Figure A.8: Firm Size Distribution by Quartile of Tangible Fixed Assets
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Notes: these graphs show the observed and counterfactual operating revenue distribution by quartiles
of tangible fixed assets in the period 1995-2007. We divide all firms in the sample into four quartiles
based on the distribution of tangible fixed assets. Q1 = (e0, e0.154) million in fixed assets; Q2 =
(e0.145,e0.463); Q3 = (e0.463,e1.163); Q4 = (e1.163,∞). The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the
LTU threshold. The estimation method is identical to that applied in Figure 2 and explained in the
main text. (Bin width= e60,101).
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Figure A.9: Reported Material Expenditures by Quartiles of Employment
80
82
84
86
88
90
M
at
er
ial
 E
xp
en
dit
ur
es
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
Q1_empl
80
82
84
86
88
90
M
at
er
ial
 E
xp
en
dit
ur
es
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
Q2_empl
70
75
80
85
90
M
at
er
ial
 E
xp
en
dit
ur
es
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
Q3_empl
62
64
66
68
70
M
at
er
ial
 E
xp
en
dit
ur
es
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
Q4_empl
Notes: these graphs show the average ratio of material expenditures as a percentage of total revenue by
sector of activity, the same outcome as Figure 4a in the main text. We divide all firms in the sample
into four quartiles based on the employment distribution. Q1 = 0-9 employees; Q2 = 10-21 employees;
Q3 = 22-38 employees; Q4 = 39 or more employees. The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU
threshold. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the grey dashed lines show 95% confidence
intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize observations
in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal to the 1st
and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million. (Bin width=
e120,202).
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Figure A.10: Reported Material Expenditures by Quartiles of Tangible Fixed Assets
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Notes: these graphs show the average ratio of material expenditures as a percentage of total revenue, the
same outcome as Figure 4a in the main text. We divide all firms in the sample into four quartiles based
on the distribution of total fixed assets. Q1 = (e0, e0.154) million in fixed assets; Q2 = (e0.145,e0.463);
Q3 = (e0.463,e1.163); Q4 = (e1.163,∞). The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU threshold.
The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the grey dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals
for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize observations in the
top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal to the 1st and
99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million. (Bin width=
e120,202).
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Figure A.11: Reported Labor Expenditures by Quartiles of Employment
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Notes: these graphs show the average ratio of the net wage bill as a percentage of total revenue. The net
wage bill is defined as the total wage bill excluding employee-contributed payroll taxes (social security
contributions), as in Figure 4b in the main text. We divide all firms in the sample into four quartiles based
on the employment distribution. Q1 = 0-9 employees; Q2 = 10-21 employees; Q3 = 22-38 employees; Q4
= 39 or more employees. The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU threshold. The black dotted
lines denote bin averages and the gray dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals for each bin average.
To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1% of
the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal to the 1st and 99th percentile. We do this
for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million. (Bin width= e120,202).
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Figure A.12: Reported Labor Expenditures by Quartiles of Tangible Fixed Assets
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Notes: these graphs show the average ratio of the net wage bill as a percentage of total revenue by
sector of activity. The net wage bill is defined as the total wage bill excluding employee-contributed
payroll taxes (social security contributions), as in Figure 4b. We divide all firms in the sample into four
quartiles based on the distribution of total fixed assets. Q1 = (e0, e0.154) million in fixed assets; Q2
= (e0.145,e0.463); Q3 = (e0.463,e1.163); Q4 = (e1.163,∞). The dashed (red) vertical line indicates
the LTU threshold. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the gray dashed lines show 95%
confidence intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize
observations in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal
to the 1st and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million.
(Bin width= e120,202).
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Figure A.13: Reported Input Expenditures: Different Bin Sizes
(a) Reported Material Expenditures
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(b) Reported Labor Expenditures
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Notes: these graphs show the averages of reported inputs (materials and labor) using smaller bin sizes
than in Figure 4. For each outcome, the figure on the left uses a bin width of e30,050, and the figure
on the right uses a bin width of e60,101. The patterns are essentially the same as in the figure from the
main text, where the bin size is e120,202.
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Figure A.14: Reported Input Expenditures: Wholesale vs. Retail
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Notes: these graphs show average material and labor expenditures (the same outcomes as in Figure 4
in the main text) for two broad sectors, wholesale and retail. These sectors are chosen because they
represent two polar cases in terms of the share of sales made to final consumers. The sector definitions
are broader than in some of the previous exercises to ensure enough sample size. Wholesale includes
wholesale trade and motor vehicles. Retail includes retail trade and restaurants and hotels. The dashed
(red) vertical line indicates the LTU threshold. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the gray
dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme
values, we winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we
set those values equal to the 1st and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range
y ∈ (3, 9) million. (Bin width= e120,202).
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Figure A.15: Reported Corporate Income Tax Base by Sector
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Notes: these graphs show the average CIT tax base (taxable profit) as a percentage of total revenue by
sector of activity. We distinguish 5 broad sectors of activity to ensure that there is enough statistical
power to compare the behavior of firms below and above the LTU threshold, indicated by the the dashed
(red) vertical line. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the gray dashed lines show 95%
confidence intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize
observations in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal
to the 1st and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million.
The “CIT tax base” is estimated as explained in the note to Figure 5. (Bin width= e120,202).
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Figure A.16: Reported Value Added Tax Base by Sector
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Notes: these graphs show the average value-added tax (VAT) base as a percentage of total revenue by
sector of activity. We distinguish 5 broad sectors of activity to ensure that there is enough statistical
power to compare the behavior of firms below and above the LTU threshold, indicated by the the dashed
(red) vertical line. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the gray dashed lines show 95%
confidence intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize
observations in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal
to the first and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million.
(Bin width= e120,202).
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Figure A.17: Reported Tax Bases: Different Bin Sizes
(a) Reported Taxable Profits (as % of Total Revenue)
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(b) Reported Value Added (as % of Total Revenue)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Va
lue
 A
dd
ed
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Va
lue
 A
dd
ed
 (%
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operating Revenue (million euros)
Bin Average 95% confidence interval
Notes: these graphs show the averages of reported tax bases (taxable profits and value added) using
smaller bin sizes than in Figure 5 in the main text. For each outcome, the figure on the left uses a bin
width of e30,050, and the figure on the right uses a bin width of e60,101. The patterns are essentially
the same as in Figure 5, where the bin size is e120,202. The dashed (red) vertical line indicates the LTU
threshold. The black dotted lines denote bin averages and the gray dashed lines show 95% confidence
intervals for each bin average. To avoid the spurious effect of extreme values, we winsorize observations
in the top and bottom 1% of the outcome variable, meaning that we set those values equal to the first
and 99th percentile. We do this for each e1-million interval in the range y ∈ (3, 9) million.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Number of Observations by 2-digit CNAE Sector codes
Sector CNAE-2009 Sector Codes # of Observations
PrimarySector 01-09,19 - Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining 3,738 1.63%
Manuf_FoodBev 10,11,12 - Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco 9,257 4.03%
Manuf_NonMetals 22,23 - Manufacture of plastics and non-metallic minerals 8,583 3,74%
Manuf_Metals 24,25 - Metal products, machinery 7,358 3.20%
Manuf_Equipment 26-28,33 - Manufacture of computers, electronics, equipment 5,506 2.40%
Manuf_Others 13-17,20,21,29-32 - Textiles, clothing, wood, paper, chemicals 17,367 7.56%
Const_Buildings 41 - Construction of buildings 25,888 11.27%
Const_SpecializedAct 43 - Specialized construction activities 10,327 4.50%
MotorVehicles 45 - Wholesale trade and repair of motor vehicles 12,134 5.28%
WholesaleTrade 46 - Wholesale trade (except motor vehicles) 66,406 28.92%
RetailTrade 47 - Retail trade 11,715 5.10%
RestHotels 55,56,79 - Hotels, restaurants and travel agencies 19,977 8.70%
Transportation 49-52 - Transportation by land, water, air, support activities 7,101 3.09%
CulturalActiv 18,58-60,90,93 - Publishing, movies, radio & TV, sports 4,934 2.15%
RealEstate 68,77- Real estate, rental and leasing 4,334 1.89%
OtherServices 53,61-64,69-75,78,80-82,85-88,92,95-96 - Other services 15,004 6.53%
Source: CBB dataset described in the main text for the number of observations. For the sector classifi-
cations, see http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/clasificaciones/cnae09/estructuraen.pdf.
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Table A.2: Revenue Threshold: Corporate Income Tax Benefit for Small Firms
Year Threshold Standard tax rate Special tax rate Applicable range
1999
e1.5 million
35% 30%
2000 Up to
2001 e3 million e90,151
2002
e5 million
of taxable
2003 profits
2004 e6 million
2005
e8 million
Up to
2006 e120,202 of
2007 32.5% 27.5% taxable profits
Source: the applicable laws are: Law 43/1995 (Article 122), Law 6/2000 (Article 122), Law 24/2001
(Article 122), Law 4/2004 (Article 108), Law 2/2004 of the Presupuestos Generales del Estado (Annual
Government Budget Law, Article 108).
Table A.3: Overview of the Spanish Tax System
Top tax rate Share of tax revenue
Social Security Contributions (PRT) 38% 33%
Personal Income Tax (PIT) 48% (46%) 22%
Value-Added Tax (VAT) 16% 19%
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 35% (30%) 13%
Other indirect taxes and fees - 13%
Federal Tax Revenue / GDP 30-37%
Sources: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (2011). The top marginal rate of the individual income tax was
reduced to 46% 2005. The top marginal rate of the corporate income tax was reduced to 32.5% in 2006
and 30% in 2007. The data on tax revenues reflects averages for the period 1999-2007 and includes
regional-level revenues in all calculations.
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Table A.4: CBB Dataset Compared to Official CIT Statistics
All Firms e3-e10 million
1995
Official Statistics 564,146 20,686
CBB Database 435,482 77.9% 12,592 60.9%
1996
Official Statistics 607,186 22,216
CBB Database 483,028 80.4% 13,924 62.7%
1997
Official Statistics 651,510 23,892
CBB Database 530,590 82.2% 16,216 67.9%
1998
Official Statistics 700,169 25,659
CBB Database 591,974 85.3% 18,453 71.9%
1999
Official Statistics 743,660 26,199
CBB Database 604,744 81.3% 20,083 76.7%
2000
Official Statistics 823,659 31,294
CBB Database 635,627 77.2% 22,468 71.8%
2001
Official Statistics 872,713 34,391
CBB Database 726,119 83.2% 25,561 74.6%
2002
Official Statistics 942,148 37,157
CBB Database 813,516 86.3% 29,003 78.1%
2003
Official Statistics 971,756 39,786
CBB Database 879,042 90.5% 32,191 80.9%
2004
Official Statistics 1,042,725 43,062
CBB Database 953,153 91.4% 35,846 83.2%
2005
Official Statistics 1,121,879 46,977
CBB Database 1,024,183 91.3% 40,422 86.0%
2006
Official Statistics 1,267,542 52,396
CBB Database 1,054,238 83.2% 43,325 82.7%
2007
Official Statistics 1,330,911 55,843
CBB Database 1,068,001 80.2% 39,728 71.1%
Notes: The percentages indicate the proportion of firms with a legal status of Sociedad Anónima (SA,
equivalent to Corporation) or Sociedad Limitada (SL, equivalent to Limited Liability Company) in the
CBB dataset compared to the number of firms with the same legal status that submitted a corporate
income tax return that year. Official statistics have been compiled by the fiscal division of Banco de
España based on several issues of “Memoria de Administración Tributaria”, an annual report published
by the Spanish tax agency (AEAT, 1995-2007). The CBB dataset is described in detail in section 4.
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Table A.5: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Operating Revenue (million e) 4.669 1.447 4.253 3.005 9.015 285,580
Material Expenditures (million e) 3.630 1.449 3.347 0.000 28.698 279,878
Net Wage Bill (million e) 0.520 0.530 0.369 0.000 11.017 260,884
Taxable Profits (million e) 0.245 0.356 0.116 0.002 5.295 237,180
CIT Liability (million e) 0.068 0.116 0.027 -0.644 1.826 279,879
Value Added (million e) 0.959 1.037 0.692 -6.325 33.579 280,371
Tangible Fixed Assets (million e) 1.041 1.979 0.455 0.000 138.412 282,477
Number of Employees (FTE) 27.8 28.1 20 0 429 247,884
Material Expenditures (% of Revenue) 77.7% 17.8% 82.0% 0.0% 358.7% 279,878
Net Wage Bill (% of Revenue) 11.2% 10.4% 8.3% 0.0% 122.4% 260,885
Taxable Profit Margin (% of Revenue) 5.17% 6.8% 2.63% 0.0% 86.6% 237,184
Value Added (% of Revenue) 20.4% 19.2% 15.9% -70.2% 419.7% 280,374
Notes: this table shows summary statistics for firms in the final dataset used for analysis, which is
restricted to firms with reported revenue y ∈(e3.01,e9.01) million. The top and bottom 1% of the
variables “Materials as % of revenue”, “Labor as % of revenue”, “Fixed assets as % of revenue” and
“Average gross wage” were dropped from the initial dataset to prevent outliers (and potentially incorrect
data entries) from biasing the empirical estimations. The number of observations is different for each
variable due to missing values, an issue especially relevant for the number of employees variable, which
is not reported by about 20% of the firms.
Source: annual data from the Banco de España’s CBB dataset for Spanish firms in the period 1995-2007,
built using administrative data from Registro Mercantil. More details about the dataset are given in
online appendix D.
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Table A.6: Sensitivity Analysis, Pooled 1995-2007 data
Polynomial Excluded Interval Bunching Estimators Obs.
degree q ylb yub bav badj
4 5.30 6.68 0.151 0.439 285,570
(0.015)*** (0.079)***
5 5.30 6.68 0.140 0.411 285,570
(0.013)*** (0.072)***
4 5.40 6.68 0.149 0.433 285,570
(0.012)*** (0.068)***
5 5.40 6.71 0.147 0.431 285,570
(0.011)*** (0.064)***
4 5.50 6.59 0.140 0.408 285,570
(0.009)*** (0.050)***
5 5.50 6.62 0.135 0.394 285,570
(0.008)*** (0.048)***
4 5.60 6.53 0.131 0.381 285,570
(0.008)*** (0.041)***
5 5.60 6.59 0.129 0.375 285,570
(0.007)*** (0.040)***
4 5.70 6.47 0.120 0.350 285,570
(0.006)*** (0.035)***
5 5.70 6.53 0.121 0.382 285,570
(0.007)*** (0.036)***
4 5.80 6.38 0.106 0.301 285,570
(0.004)*** (0.023)***
5 5.80 6.41 0.108 0.312 285,570
(0.004)*** (0.020)***
Notes: this table shows the sensitivity of the bunching estimators to different assumptions on the excluded
region used to estimate the counterfactual and the order of the polynomial. In all rows, we use the pooled
1995-2007 sample including all firms with reported revenue y ∈(e3.01,e9.01). We pick different values
of q, as shown in the first column, and ylb, as shown in the second column. We obtain the corresponding
values for yub and the point estimates for the bunching estimators bav and badj using the methods
described in the main text. The results are very similar for all the reasonable choices of the lower bound
(ylb), and for polynomials of degree 4 and 5. We highlight the results for ylb = 5.70 and q = 5, which are
the values chosen to produce the main estimation results. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and
* = 10%.
xxxiv
Table A.7: Sensitivity of Adjusted Bunching Estimator by Year
Upper Bound of Estimation Interval
Year Y D = 6.07 Y D = 6.13 Y D = 6.19
Pooled data
1995-2007 0.353 0.382 0.424
(0.032) (0.036) (0.043)
Annual data
1995 0.408 0.257 0.331
(0.170) (0.079) (0.121)
1996 0.303 0.395 0.379
(0.069) (0.111) (0.105)
1997 0.538 0.515 0.634
(0.125) (0.118) (0.173)
1998 0.331 0.351 0.368
(0.069) (0.077) (0.084)
1999 0.326 0.416 0.508
(0.065) (0.097) (0.139)
2000 0.601 0.660 0.698
(0.138) (0.166) (0.188)
2001 0.313 0.350 0.437
(0.060) (0.073) (0.105)
2002 0.429 0.410 0.401
(0.116) (0.109) (0.107)
2003 0.302 0.348 0.381
(0.064) (0.080) (0.095)
2004 0.497 0.550 0.566
(0.109) (0.132) (0.142)
2005 0.268 0.321 0.356
(0.034) (0.045) (0.054)
2006 0.292 0.298 0.317
(0.042) (0.044) (0.048)
2007 0.301 0.305 0.351
(0.051) (0.053) (0.067)
Notes: this table shows the sensitivity of the adjusted bunching estimator blbadj to different values of the
upper bound of the interval on which this parameter is estimated, yD. The main estimates reported in
Table 1 are reported in the central column here. When yD = 6.07, the proportion of non-bunchers α is
estimated as the ratio of the counterfactual frequency to the actual frequency in the first bin to the right
of the LTU threshold. When yD = 6.13 and yD = 6.20, we use the first two and three bins, respectively.
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Table A.8: Sensitivity of Adjusted Bunching Estimator by Sector
Upper Bound of Estimation Interval
Sector Y D = 6.07 Y D = 6.13 Y D = 6.19
Primary Sector 1.305 1.301 0.571
(12.569) (21.917) (0.595)
Manuf. Food and Beverages 0.327 0.533 0.510
(0.115) (0.320) (0.299)
Manuf. Non-Metals 0.235 0.245 0.294
(0.047) (0.050) (0.067)
Manuf. Metals 0.434 0.528 0.450
(0.107) (0.152) (0.117)
Manuf. Equipment 0.263 0.300 0.513
(0.085) (0.107) (0.374)
Manuf. Others 0.331 0.291 0.306
(0.096) (0.079) (0.087)
Construction of Buildings 0.363 0.478 0.499
(0.067) (0.105) (0.114)
Specialized Constr. Activ. 0.414 0.496 0.529
(0.071) (0.097) (0.109)
Motor Vehicles 0.372 0.361 0.345
(0.080) (0.077) (0.072)
Wholesale (exc. Motor V.) 0.330 0.342 0.384
(0.027) (0.029) (0.035)
Transportation 0.415 0.485 0.595
(0.093) (0.124) (0.190)
Retail Trade 0.239 0.283 0.338
(0.046) (0.061) (0.082)
Restaurants and Hotels 0.554 0.470 0.719
(0.661) (0.389) (4.679)
Cultural Activities 0.232 0.393 0.449
(0.119) (0.439) (2.375)
Real Estate -5.457 0.952 0.456
(46.054) (5.939) (0.729)
Other Services 0.275 0.326 0.455
(0.054) (0.071) (0.125)
Notes: this table shows the sensitivity of the adjusted bunching estimator blbadj to different values of the
upper bound of the interval on which this parameter is estimated, yD. The main estimates reported in
Table 2 are reported in the central column here. When yD = 6.07, the proportion of non-bunchers α is
estimated as the ratio of the counterfactual frequency to the actual frequency in the first bin to the right
of the LTU threshold. When yD = 6.13 and yD = 6.20, we use the first two and three bins, respectively.
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